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Insider Trading: The Misappropriation Theory
Ignored: Ginsburg's O'Hagan
DAVID COWAN BAYNE, S.J.*
[The Ginsburg Majority] engages in the "imagi-
native" exercise of constructing its own misap-
propriation theory from whole cloth .... [This]
new theory.., suffers from a ... dispositive
flaw: It is not the theory offered by the Commis-
sion. Indeed, . . . this . . . completely novel ...
theory has never been proposed by the Commis-
sion, much less adopted by rule or otherwise.
-Thomas, J., Dissenting in O'Hagan.1
Unfortunately-or perhaps to some, fortunately-the Supreme
Court has yet to address the Misappropriation Theory. The conflicting
Circuits, three to two,2 remain in the same darkness that enveloped them
before United States v. O'Hagan3 came up on certiorari. Justice Gins-
burg, who wrote the Supreme Court O'Hagan, completely bypassed the
Theory considered by the five battling Circuits, then concocted her own
New Theory in revealing detail, and accordingly concluded that James
Herman O'Hagan was indeed in violation of this New Theory.
In short, the thesis of this Article is narrow and precise: The law of
* Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2224, 2226 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
2. The Second Circuit, progenitor of the Misappropriation Theory in United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992), had been joined by
the Seventh Circuit in SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071
(1992) and the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). In 1995, the Fourth
Circuit broke ranks in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), which was followed by
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd and remanded,
117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997).
3. 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd and remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997), on remand, 139
F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998).
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Insider Trading is exactly where it was on the day the Eighth Circuit
handed down O'Hagan. The Ginsburg Opinion never directly faced the
concise question posed by the five Circuits: Does the Misappropriation
Theory conform to Section 10(b)?
Because Justice Ginsburg avoided this question judicially, and
founded her holding on a New Theory not before the Court, all else
about the Misappropriation Theory itself is obiter. Thus, the lone pur-
pose is to show that the O'Hagan majority spoke adjudicatively only
about the Ginsburg New Theory and only obiter about the Misappropria-
tion Theory.
The Consequences of This Narrow Objective
Thus sharply circumscribed, this Article will not move afield to a
discussion of the ramified subjects raised by Ginsburg's collateral
remarks about the Misappropriation Theory still awaiting a Supreme
Court ruling.
These incidental reflections are meant to be a temptation-even a
mandatory invitation-to later articles addressing the flaws long cloud-
ing the law of Insider Trading.
In direct response to this mandatory invitation, a second Article
will join this present endeavor to complete a two-part Study of
O'Hagan. "Insider Trading: Ginsburg's O'Hagan: Insider Trading
Ignored"4 will be forthcoming.
Consider the present Article as the opening salvo. A clearing-the-
battlefield study toward other assaults on the remaining errors afflicting
the law. Subsequent critiques of O'Hagan-bolstered by this two-part
Study-are expected to facilitate a return to the rational days of the
SEC's Cady, Roberts5 and its progeny.
A Necessary Prelection
To set the scene, five rudimentary questions must be answered: (1)
What, in intelligible layman language, is an Insider Trade? (2) How has
the law traditionally treated this tort? (3) What is the Misappropriation
Theory, in its original form as presented to the O'Hagan Court? (4)
What are the unencumbered facts in O'Hagan? (5) How did the three
Courts-District, Circuit, and Supreme-rule on these facts?
With these queries answered, the way will then lie open to show
that the Ginsburg Majority did not, in fact, address the question before
4. David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider Trading: Ginsburg's O'Hagan: Insider Trading
Ignored (forthcoming).
5. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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it, but rather constructed its own misappropriation theory from whole
cloth,6 and thus conveniently reversed the Eighth Circuit. But, effec-
tively finessing the Original Theory actually before it.
(1) The Insider Trade in Primitive Simplicity
Probably the root cause for the chaos in the law of Insider Trading
and the muddled thinking of so many absurd holdings is ignorance of a
basic truth: The Insider Trade is a rudimentary scam. It is not a com-
plex concept. The essence of the trade is indistinguishable from the sale
of an infertile bull, a house with an inoperable furnace, a car with a
cracked engine-block.
Five pat Fables will penetrate the confusion in Ginsburg's
O'Hagan. Keep these ABCs in mind:
The Case of the Nuclear Dump: The young couple, just now wed,
trusted the long-time, esteemed land-developer and paid $150,000 for
the new home. Only to join fifty other similarly-duped buyers who find
that their homes lay atop acres of nuclear waste, long known to the
builder. The postdiscovery value: $50,000.
The Dividend-less Widow: Emily Hotchkiss of Burr Oak, on the
Kansas plains, having decided to unload her shares in Elmhurst Invest-
ment, approached that nice CEO toward a sale, and prudently asked if a
dividend was in the offing on her common. The reply: "I won't know
till the Board votes in New York. But meanwhile I will be happy to buy
your shares at market."
The upshot: The following day the Widdie Hotchkiss sold to the
CEO at $1.25. Three days later a $1.00 dividend was declared. The
truth: The deceitful CEO had known full well that the dividend was
already certain, and that the trusting Widow would get $1.25 for a share
worth $2.25.'
The Stock Worth a Goldmine: In the prototypal Texas Gulf
Sulphur,8 the swindled seller sat on an "exploratory drill hole" of silver,
zinc, and copper so remarkable that five TGS expert witnesses had never
seen or heard of a comparable find.9
Yet, before the public announcement, the Insiders, with full knowl-
6. Having rejected the [SEC's] description of its [misappropriation] theory, the
majority then engages in the "imaginative" exercise of constructing its own
misappropriation theory from whole cloth.
O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2224 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added).
7. See Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932).
8. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
9. See id. at 843.
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edge of the "goldmine," rushed to telephones, bought from thousands of
unknowing shareholders, pocketed millions of dollars. Before the press
release, TGS common had closed at 18. Two weeks later, it inevitably
reached the rewarding level of 58-3/8.10
Vinnie the Markup Man: In the most celebrated Insider Trading
case to date-and a chief contributor to the current quagmire-Vinnie
Chiarella, working at Pandick Press, learned definitely and indisputably
all the details of several impending takeovers. Thus armed, Vinnie
bought low before, sold high after and "netted $30,000 from the inno-
cent victims when the price jumped after the tender."' 1
James Herman O'Hagan, Con Man: The Dorsey law firm, largest
in Minnesota, represented the Brit multinational Grand Met toward the
takeover of the Pillsbury Doughboy. O'Hagan, Dorsey's top securities
man, learned at the watercooler of the buyout by Grand Met, bought
Pillsbury common from in-the-dark sellers, and sold after the news hit
the press. Innocent Pillsbury shareholders lost $4 million to James
Herman. 12
(2) The Legal Essentials of the Tort
The crime of Insider Trading is none other than the common-law
tort of Deceit codified into Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,1 3 and then
criminalized by the addition of appropriate special penalties. The four
Essentials of the basic tort, therefore, become by that very fact the
intrinsic constituents of the crime of Insider Trading. This was the
crime that sent, or should have sent, the five miscreants to jail in the
real-life Fables highlighting the stripped-down essentials of the Insider
Trade.
Hark back to its common-law genesis in 190914 and realize that the
tort of Insider Trading must meet the five requisites of every tort: (1)
Duty, (2) Breach, (3) Proximate Cause, (4) Damages, (5) Absence of
Defenses.' 5 Then adapt these to the "deceit" specifics: A misstatement
of a material fact, made knowingly, scienter, to induce reliance, with
consequent reliance, and damages. 16
10. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
11. David Cowan Bayne, S.J., The Insider's Natural Law Duty: Chestman and the
'Misappropriation Theory,' 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 79, 120 (1994).
12. The facts in these cases were adapted somewhat to conform to a "fable" format.
13. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
14. See Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
15. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-
65 (5th ed. 1984).
16. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 (1976). See also David Cowan Bayne, S.J.,
Insider Trading: The Essence of the Insider's Duty, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 315, 321 (1992).
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THE FEDERAL ADAPTION: SECTION 10(b)
In 1934, the Congress embodied these "deceit" basics in the securi-
ties laws, specifically in Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act,
which was in turn implemented by the Commission in Rule l0b-5."7
O'Hagan centered on this Rule:
Pursuant to its § 10(b) rulemaking authority, the Commission
has adopted Rule lOb-5, which, as relevant here, provides:
"It shall be unlawful...
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or]
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
"in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."18
In these words, for over sixty years, courts have found all the long-
time requisites of common-law deceit, and later the specific tort of
Insider Trading as first enunciated by the Supreme Court in Strong v.
Repide19 in 1909.
In the present context, these Essentials can be distilled into four,
which thus facilitates an analysis of the five Fables. And in turn will
shed light on O'Hagan: (a) The Gravamen: Nondisclosure to the Inves-
tor; (b) A Simple Duty: To Disclose to the Investor; (c) The Victim: The
Deceived Investor; (d) In Connection With a Deceitful Trade.
Consider the five Fables in light of these four Essentials of Insider
Trading:
(a) The Gravamen: Nondisclosure to the Investor
In each story the wrong, the Breach, was Deception. The deceitful
land-developer hid the truth about the contaminated waste dump. The
Kansas widow was not told the true value of her stock. The TGS Insid-
ers failed to disclose the 'goldmine' beneath the public's stock. Vinnie
lied to his sellers. James Herman conveniently forgot that the Investors'
stock was undervalued by $4 million.
In every case, the essence of the Wrong was a misstatement of a
material fact, made knowingly, with reliance and consequent damages.
The Breach was Deception. Except for the home-buying couple-who
were victims of a nonstock common-law land scam-each was an inno-
cent Investor facing an Insider who traded on the basis of undisclosed
confidential information.
17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
18. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996)).
19. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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(b) A Simple Duty: To Disclose to the Investor
Every malefactor of the Fables knew he had a Duty to Disclose any
hidden defects in the product traded. He knew innately that his only
legitimate advantage could come from business acumen, honest
research, market savoir, and not from contrivance or no-risk knowledge
of a sure thing. The nuclear waste, the declared-but-undisclosed divi-
dend, the ready-to-be-mined ore, and the surefire price rises for Vinnie
and James Herman were all facts that each withheld illegally.
Note especially that these illicit dollars were not earned through
astute analysis, sophisticated trading expertise, canny speculative
impulse, or even the smile of Lady Luck. Rather, the scam depended on
no-risk, reliable-not-conjectural, nonpublic information, relevant and
material to an informed trade, which the duped had a right to know. In
short, the deck was stacked.
All five sharpsters subconsciously knew that they owed this Duty
to Disclose to the innocent Investor with whom they dealt. While they
may not have verbalized the ultimate moral foundation of this Duty,
each felt in his heart that he should protect a fellow human from a disas-
ter he could easily avert by the truth.2 ° That he should not be dishonest.
That he should not lie. These obligations are innate, common to all men,
known by all.2 1 Each knew he was taking unfair advantage of an
innocent.
(c) The Victim: The Deceived Investor
No dispute could possibly arise as to the identity of the Victim
defrauded. In every Fable, the Innocent faced a deliberate lie from the
other side of the trade. This was the central point of each story, and
clear beyond doubt. But a corollary factor was also of special note.
The noteworthy factor: None of the Victims cared a whit about how
or where the Insider learned of the undisclosed Information-how or
where the land-developer originally discovered the nuclear hazard, or
the CEO was told of the dividend declaration, or the TGS experts
became privy to the ore bonanza, or Vinnie figured out the names of the
takeover targets, or James Herman got the word of the secret takeover.
The key consideration was the lone fact: The Insider did actually have
secret information, and acted on it to deceive his fellow trader, and gain
illicit dollars.
20. See Bayne, supra note 16, at 340, 341.
21. See David C. Bayne, S.J., The Natural Law for Lawyers-A Primer, 5 DEPAUL L. REV.
159, 171-85 (1956) (especially at 181-85). See also DAVID COWAN BAYNE, S.J., CONSCIENCE,
OBLIGATION, AND THE LAW 93-110 (2d ed. 1986).
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(d) In Connection With a Deceitful Trade
Obviously the Deception of all the Victims occurred during, as
integral to, through, the business transaction. The Fraud was consum-
mated in the trade. The Deceit did not antedate the transaction, but was
practiced on the Victim during the trade.
The first Fable, it should be noted, purposely carried a special
message. In it, the Deceit was practiced, not in a securities sale on an
Investor, but on home buyers in a real-estate sale. The Case of the
Nuclear Dump was a fictional concoction-all the others were based on
actual court cases-to illustrate two important relevancies:
(1) That the essential fraud in the Insider Trade is
substantively indistinguishable from common-law Deceit,
which covers all manner of transaction-related duplicity, as
in the sale of a horse, a car. Or a house.
(2) That the Deception in a Section-10(b) stock fraud
acquires its accidental differentiation from its common-
law, nonstock, counterpart solely by the addition of the
statutory requisite that the Deception must be perpetrated
"in connection with" a securities transaction.
(3) The Original Misappropriation Theory
Conveniently, the essential elements of the Misappropriation The-
ory were fully formulated at an early date in its brief history-in spite of
a "somewhat harrowing evolution" 22-and were authoritatively stated in
a consensus definition by the Ninth Circuit's Clark, and repeated by the
Fourth:
Those courts that have adopted the misappro-
priation theory with which we are concerned in
this case have read section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5
to authorize the criminal conviction of a person
who (1) misappropriates material nonpublic
information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of
a relationship of trust and confidence and (3)
uses that information in a securities transaction,
(4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to
the shareholders of the traded stock.23
This consensus definition will later be analyzed under its four
Essentials: A. The Gravamen: Theft of Information. B. A Fiduciary
Duty: Not To Steal. C. The Victim: The Owner of Information. D.
With No Connection With a Deceitful Trade.
22. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 953 (4th Cir. 1995).
23. Id. at 944 (quoting SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added).
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This was the Theory before all five Circuits, as well as the
O'Hagan District Court that relied on it to convict Mr. O'Hagan. This,
moreover, is the Original Theory-here presented in its most succinct
form, without commentary or analysis-that will be the focus of this
study of Ginsburg's O'Hagan.
(4) The Plight of James O'Hagan
Sadly, James Herman O'Hagan had a checkered past. As a senior
partner in Minnesota's most prestigious law firm, Dorsey and Whitney,
O'Hagan, at 56, had already been convicted of theft from a Dorsey cli-
ent-trust-fund and sentenced to eight concurrent prison terms. Next, he
was found guilty of $750,000 in tax delinquencies,24 was the subject of a
lengthy SEC investigation in the late eighties, and was then disbarred.
Now he faces criminal charges for blatant Insider Trading, which had
yielded him an undeserved $4 million.25
In the process of gaining $4 million and evoking criminal charges,
Mr. O'Hagan gave the legal world the fifth Fable, the story of an ele-
mental-even naive, for a securities lawyer-Insider Trade, that will
rank with Mr. Chiarella's of Chiarella2 6 infamy. The O'Hagan story
was simplicity itself.
In approximately July of 1988, Grand Met .... a large
diversified company based in London, England, retained
Dorsey & Whitney as local counsel because Grand Met
was interested in acquiring the Pillsbury Company .... a
Minneapolis, Minnesota, company.27
With incontrovertible information in hand, Mr. O'Hagan secretly
over a two-month period, systematically amassed a sizable amount of
Pillsbury common stock. "On October 4, 1988, Grand Met publicly
announced its tender offer for Pillsbury stock."28
With that, the inevitable happened.2 9 "Pillsbury stock immediately
24. See O'Hagan v. United States, 86 F.3d 776 (8th Cir. 1996).
25. See Kevin G. Salwen, SEC Files Charges of Insider Trading in Pillsbury Offer, WALL ST.
J., Jan. 11, 1990, at A6. See also Ex-Attorney Convicted in Inside-Trading Case Tied to Pillsbury
Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb. 11, 1994; Former Lawyer Told to Pay $7.7 Million for Insider Trading,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1995.
26. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
27. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612, 614 (8th Cir. 1996). Paul J. Deveney, World
Watch, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 1997 at A12. In more recent developments, Grand Met has now
become, with Guinness, Diageo.
28. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614.
29. "'When a tender offer is announced, usually the price of the target company rises and the
price of the offeror falls or remains the same."' O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614 n.3 (quoting SEC v.
Maio, 51 F.3d 623, 628 n.3 (7th Cir. 1995))."
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rose from $39 per share to almost $60 per share."3 The result: Mr.
O'Hagan "realized a profit of over $4,00,0003 '31 at the expense of inno-
cent, unknowing Investors who had originally sold to O'Hagan without
the knowledge of the forthcoming takeover and the true value of its
stock. O'Hagan's Inside Information was
reliable, not conjectural, nonpublic, relevant and mate-
rial to an informed trade ... which ... the Shareholder
has a right to know
32
as the Compendium33-a detailed, studied, exact delineation of all the
elements of the Insider's Duty-succinctly laid out in the "Formal State-
ment of Insider Duty" in Essence in 1992. 34
(5) The Judicial Process Takes Over
The SEC soon began the judicial process against O'Hagan, a suc-
cessful attorney for 26 years, "highly respected by clients and fellow
attorneys[,] ... specializing in... securities cases."35 Shortly, the SEC
secured a fifty-seven count indictment in the District Court in Minnesota
on the grounds of mail fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering.
The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted O'Hagan
on all 57 counts. The district court sentenced O'Hagan to
41 months of imprisonment. O'Hagan appeals.36
This conviction was founded solely on the Misappropriation Theory,
with no alternative reliance.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated-remarkably to O'Hagan-
all of O'Hagan's convictions. But the core of the reversal was the inval-
idation of the insider-trading count. Since the mail fraud and money
laundering depended on the Section-10(b) violation, both fell when
Judge Hansen, writing for a 2-to-1 majority, found: The Misappropria-
tion Theory does not conform to Section-i0(b) requisites, and hence will
not support a conviction of James O'Hagan.7
This was a narrow holding, and sent the Circuits into a 3-to-2
conflict.
30. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614.
31. Id.
32. Bayne, supra note 16, at 353.
33. Id. at 352-53.
34. Id.
35. State v. O'Hagan, 474 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Minn. 1991).
36. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 614.
37. Id. at 613-14. See also David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider Trading: The Demise of the
Misappropriation Theory-And Thereafter, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 625, 629 (1997).
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To the Ginsburg Court
In 1997 the Supreme Court at last decided to face the chaos of the
conflict, or so the Bench, Bar, and investing public had hoped. The
Circuits were now in a black-and-white split. The Second led the
charge, and was in fact the creator of and principal protagonist for the
Misappropriation Theory, albeit weakly, with an inconclusive 6-to-5 en
banc bench.38 Aligned with the Second were single, and half-hearted,
opinions by the Seventh and Ninth.3 9
The Bryan"° opinion, by the brilliant Judge J. Michael Luttig, was
the first to break sharply with the Theory. Judge Hansen and the Eighth
in O'Hagan retraced Bryan. This set the stage for certiorari and reversal
by Ginsburg's O'Hagan, 6 to 3. Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a dis-
sent, joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices
Breyer, Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter, and Stevens joined the Majority,
but in silence.
The Court also addressed a tender-offer question involving fraudu-
lent practices under Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act4' and Rule 14e-3(a).42
It affirmed the Eighth Circuit and ruled that the Commission did not
exceed its rulemaking authority in enacting Rule 14e-3(a).43 This ruling
does not sufficiently concern the Misappropriation Theory to warrant
specific comment. So too with the mail and wire fraud.44
Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General of the United States,
argued for the Government and John D. French, of Fagre & Benson of
Minneapolis, argued for Mr. O'Hagan.
On remand, a hapless District Judge in Minnesota will face a bewil-
dered Mr. O'Hagan still awaiting his fate.
The Task at Hand
The burden resting on this Article is to lay out successively:
I. THE ORIGINAL MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY SPLITTING THE CIRCUITS,
II. THE NEW THEORY OF GINSBURG, and III. THE Two 'THEORIES' IN
JUXTAPOSITION.
38. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004
(1992).
39. See SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992) and
SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990) respectfully.
40. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
41. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
42. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1996).
43. See generally O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2214-17 (considering the grant on which the
appellate court reversed O'Hagan's convictions for fraudulent trading with a tender offer).
44. See id. at 2219-20.
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I. THE ORIGINAL MISAPPROPRIATION THEORY SPLITING
THE CIRCUITS
The short life of the Misappropriation Theory was detailed over
many pages in "Chestman and the Misappropriation Theory"45 in 1994.
Furthermore, all three pro-Theory Circuits-the Second, the primary
proponent with Chestman,46 the Ninth in Clark,47 and the Seventh with
Cherif 8-were unanimous in their definition of the Theory. Its essen-
tials were clear to all, especially Mr. O'Hagan.
Moreover, this unqualified definition was followed in both dissent-
ing Circuits-Judge Luttig's superb Bryan49 opinion in the Fourth and
Judge Hansen in the recently ill-treated, or more accurately untreated
O'Hagan5° in the Eighth.
The beauty of the present endeavor lies in the unsullied and unqual-
ified definition of the Theory now to be laid out. This is the Theory that
the five Circuits presented to Ginsburg but she conveniently ignored.
The Unchallenged Theory
In the fourteen years of its "somewhat harrowing evolution,"'" the
Misappropriation Theory reached its crystallized form early in life.
Judge Luttig, speaking for the Fourth Circuit in Bryan, defined the
"particular theory of misappropriation adopted by our sister circuits, ' 52
the Second, Seventh and Ninth. In doing so, he used the Ninth's SEC v.
Clark:
Those courts that have adopted the misappropriation the-
ory with which we are concerned in this case have read
section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 to authorize the criminal con-
viction of a person who (1) misappropriates material non-
public information (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a
relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses that infor-
mation in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of
whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the
traded stock.5 3
45. Bayne, supra note 11, passim.
46. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004
(1992).
47. SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
48. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).
49. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
50. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd and remanded, 117 S. Ct.
2199 (1997).
51. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 953.
52. Id. at 944.
53. Id. (quoting Clark, 915 F.2d at 443) (emphasis added).
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Most important, this definition-consistently unqualified by all five
Circuits that have treated it-was also followed in the District Court's
O'Hagan.4 In short, James Herman O'Hagan was subjected to this
meaning of the Theory. This was the Theory that sent him to jail.
This was the same Theory, moreover, that both the dissenting Cir-
cuits found foreign to Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
The Four Essentials of the Original Theory
As deducible from the definition, four major Essentials demand
analysis: A. The Gravamen: Theft of Information. B. A Fiduciary
Duty: Not To Steal. C. The Victim: The Owner of Information. D. With
No Connection With a Deceitful Trade.
A. The Gravamen: Theft of Information
The unanimity of the three Theory Circuits makes this breakdown
effortless. The Second Circuit, however, was far-and-away the chief
protagonist, and its en banc Chestman was the Second's definitive pro-
nouncement on the Theory. But, as a caveat for future courts, recall this
evaluation, written in 1994, of the validity of the Second's Chestman:
Chestman, moreover, was itself the epitome of dissonance. The
eleven Judges were divided in a six-five split. The majority Opinion
by Meskill, reversing the District Court, was a mishmash. The dis-
sent by Judge Winter was divisively compelling. Two Judges added
to the confusion with third and fourth opinions. Note too that the six-
five split was a reversal of an earlier three-Judge Second Circuit
panel, which itself had three separate opinions. (In this disarray, it
approaches an affront to the Second Circuit to attribute the holding to
the entire bench. Instead of the Chestman Court, perhaps better, the
Meskill Majority. And the Winter Five.)56
To Chestman's dissonance, add the flaccid support for the Theory
by the Seventh's Cherif and the Ninth's Clark by Judge Cynthia
Holcomb Hall.
As an equal voice in the Chestman 6-5 Opinion, Judge Winter of
the Winter Five summed up the Theory position on the core concept:
[T]heft rather than fraud or deceit, seems the gravamen of
the [misappropriation] prohibition. 7
54. SEC v. O'Hagan, 901 F. Supp. 1461, 1463-64 (D. Minn. 1995).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1995).
56. Bayne, supra note 11, at 83.




This broad-brush characterization is confirmed by the Meskill
Majority in Chestman:
Under this misappropriation theory, the "fraud" require-
ment of Rule lOb-5 is deemed to be satisfied when a person
"misappropriates material nonpublic information in breach
of a fiduciary duty or similar relationship of trust and
confidence."58
The first glimmering of the Theory in Newman59 went further and
adduced mere Theft as an essential element of the Theory.
Because the [Newman] court held that Rule lOb-5's predicate fraud
requirement was established through the mere theft of the confiden-
tial information, it undertook no inquiry into whether there was the
statutorily required deception.6°
The Seventh Circuit's Cherif in 1991 was the most emphatic in
citing Theft as the gravamen of the Theory. Cherif had openly opined
that the Theory would apply "even to 'mere' thieves,"61 without any
breach of a fiduciary duty. The other two Circuits, somewhat inexplica-
bly, always required that the "thief' also be a "fiduciary." Only thieving
trustees or thieving agents or thieving friends were liable under the
Theory.
The Fourth Circuit's Bryan opinion aptly summed up this integral
role of Theft in the Theory and supplied the perfect segue to the second
element, a "fiduciary duty":
Moreover, while the courts adopting the misappropriation theory
incant that the breach of a fiduciary relationship is a necessary ele-
ment of the offense, in principle, if not in reality, these courts would
be obliged to find liability in the case of simple theft by an employee,
even where no fiduciary duty has been breached, for the raison d'etre
of the misappropriation theory in fact is concern over "the unfairness
inherent in trading on [stolen] information."62
B. A Fiduciary Duty: Not to Steal
This second Essential of the Theory is a perplexing concoction.
Not only is it two-part, but it is a disturbing blend of two ill-fitting
parts. The first part, The Simple Duty Not To Steal, has been joined with
the far narrower obligation, The Fiduciary Duty Binding the Thief.
58. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566) (emphasis added).
59. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
60. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 954 (emphasis added).
61. Cherif, 933 F.2d at 412 n.6 (emphasis added).
62. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 951 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241 (Burger, C.J., dissenting))
(emphasis added).
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The analysis of this strange junction of two disparate, almost for-
eign, duties requires separate treatment.
(1) Unadorned Misappropriation
The first half of this unusual two-pronged obligation, The Simple
Duty Not To Steal, flows directly as an immediate corollary from the
first of the Theory Essentials, Theft.
Since Misappropriation-stealing to be blunt (in a paraphrase of
Chief Justice Burger 63)-is the Wrong condemned by the Theory, the
Duty which was violated in order to commit the Wrong, must perforce
be: Do Not Steal.
The reasoning is ready: Move from the Violation of the law to the
Duty that the violation violated. If the offense is Misappropriation,
Theft, the Duty necessarily must be: Not To Steal. From the malefaction
Theft, the illation to the Simple Duty Not To Steal can easily be made.
(2) The Limitation to Fiduciary Thieves
But "misappropriation," without more, says nothing about stealing
by a trusted fiduciary. Mere misappropriation is mere theft. Webster's
is just that succinct:
misoapoprooprioate . .. vt (1857) : to appropriate wrongly (as by
theft or embezzlement) ....
That is the whole of Webster's definition. No mention of "theft by a
trustee, or a fiduciary, or a lawyer or priest or trusted friend."
In short, the first Essential, Theft, stopped with Item (1) of the
Chestman consensus:
(1) misappropriates material nonpublic information .... 65
and said nothing about limiting the crime of Insider Trading to trustees
or fiduciaries, nor did it talk about absolving all those insider traders
who are nonfiduciary, "mere thieves."
The Genesis of the Fiduciary Thief
The Misappropriation Theorists inherited the 'fiducial" element-
albeit not the "theft" requisite-from Chiarella66 a year before the 1981
63. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
64. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1247 (1988).
65. See Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (citing Clark, 915 F.2d at 433).
66. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
In the late 70's . .. [New York attorney Stanley S.] Arkin took the case of
Vincent Chiarella, a financial printer who had traded on information he came across
in his work. Arkin fought all the way to the Supreme Court, and there he had
[Vol. 53:1
INSIDER TRADING
decision in Newman.67 The result was this remarkable anomaly: The
limited few liable under the Theory for Insider Trading must possess two
distinct qualities: First, they had to be thieves. But then, second, they
also had to be trusted confidants of the Victim of the Theft. Mere
thieves were seemingly guiltless.
And Chiarella was not a Theory case at all, but simply an inexplic-
able aberration from the mainstream common-law Deceit of the SEC's
prototypal Cady, Roberts.68 Chiarella got its "fiduciary" accretion
because the Timorous Powell did not want to hold "any person, "69 every
person, to honesty in a security trade. He felt only a trusted friend was
bound to own up to the true value of a stock. Everyone else had no
obligation to tell the truth. 70 Think that over. The only persons liable
for Insider Trading are Thieving Fiduciaries.
And so, Powell's irrational 'fiduciary" accretion in Chiarella was
picked up unthinkingly by Newman, and mouthed ever after, finally to
end up as Item (2) in the Chestman consensus:
(2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and
confidence... 71
This appendage was described at length in "The Awakening"72 in
these somewhat dramatic, but accurate, terms:
The Deus ex Machina: Fiduciary Duty
The Theorists then proceeded to roil the waters further
by intruding the equally foreign concept of fiduciary duty'
into that of 'theft.' It was not enough that 'theft' sup-
Chiarella's conviction overturned by securing a narrower definition of insider
trading.
Peter Truell, Combative Lawyer for Aggressive Brokers Is in Demand, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1998,
at D2. Truell did not emphasize that Mr. Arkin overcame the two-court rule and could thereby be
called the sire of Chiarella. He certainly gave Justice Powell some needed moral support.
67. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981).
68. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). See David Cowan Bayne, S.J., The
Insider's Natural-Law Duty: Chiarella and the 'Fiduciary' Fallacy, 19 J. CORP. L. 681 (1994).
69. Section 10(b) states:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange . . . (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988) (emphasis added).
70. See generally Bayne, supra note 68, at 714-20 (discussing the five Chiarella
relationships).
71. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (quoting Clark, 915 F.2d at 443).
72. David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: The
Awakening, 1995, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 487 (1997).
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planted 'deception.' Now the 'theft' had to be perpetrated
by a trusted fiduciary! Eventually the canonized definition
of the Theory joined the 'theft'-seemingly inextricably,
certainly inexplicably-with a 'breach of fiduciary duty.'
Liability then resulted only when a person
1) misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by
breaching a duty ... of trust ....
All five Circuits faced this accretion that was present in the consen-
sus definition of the Misappropriation Theory. Two of the five accepted
it without comment. 74 The Seventh in Cherif, however, had its doubts,
wondering if it should be present at all. The Seventh feared that "mere
thieves," without any fiducial bond to the Victim, would also be liable
under the Theory.
However, the Fourth, in Bryan, and the Eighth, in O'Hagan,
rejected the 'fiduciary" requisite out of hand.
C. The Victim: The Owner of Information
The same indisputable logic that drove the Theory from (1) the
offense of Theft to (2) the Duty Not To Steal, moved the Theory to the
conclusion that (3) the only possible Victim of a Theft-he who was
harmed by the breach of the Duty Not To Steal-had to be he from
whom the information was stolen. The causal impact of the wrong,
Theft, inexorably ran from malefaction to Victim.
In Chestman, the Victim of the Theft of the Information was the
wife, Susan Loeb-the female ingenue in the Supermarket Soap 7 -who
''owned" some secret information.
In Cherif, the poor Victim was First Chicago, the bank whose
security system Danny Cherif penetrated to get confidential information
on merger targets, which defrauded innocent-and never requited-
sellers.76
In Clark, a British firm was damaged-although it lost not a far-
thing-because Clark, an employee, secretly learned of one of its forth-
coming acquisitions and later cheated an unknowing public.77
In Bryan, the Victim was the state lottery.78 In O'Hagan, Grand
Met and the Dorsey law firm. But never the deceived Investors. 79
73. Id. at 504-04 (quoting Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (diting Clark, 915 F.2d at 433) (emphasis
added)).
74. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991).
75. Bayne, supra note 11, at 84-86.
76. 933 F.2d at 403.
77. 915 F.2d at 439.
78. 58 F.3d at 933.
79. 117 S. Ct. at 2199.
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Of course, in O'Hagan James Herman O'Hagan fleeced his sellers
of over $4 million. And in all the Theory cases, the public traders lost
substantial sums in similar securities sales. But under the Theory the
public Investor was not the Victim. The source of the information was
the aggrieved one, the only object of the Theory's solicitude.
The first Theory case, Newman, was responsible for putting this
third Theory Essential on the books:
"The Court [in Newman] was ... influenced by the damage inflicted
on the insider trader's employer by a conniving employee."80
Each succeeding Theory case endorsed this tenet, and it became
engrafted on the Theory ever after.
D. With No Connection With a Deceitful Trade
This last and fourth Essential of the Theory has both negative and
positive aspects-the obverse and reverse of the same coin-that
demand individual treatment. In order to understand this fourth Essen-
tial well, both aspects will be studied in order, the negative first and then
the positive: (1) No Relation to a Securities Trade and (2) In a Theft of
Information.
Note that the formal description of the fourth Essential-and the
heading of this subsection-is couched in negative terms, for good rea-
son. The Original Misappropriation Theory-here now delineated-is
later to be juxtaposed with Justice Ginsburg's New Theory, and for such
a comparison the negative aspect of the fourth Essential is most
appropriate.
(1) No Relation to a Securities Trade
This fourth Essential of the Theory owes its existence to the statu-
tory requirement of the 1934 Act: That the Deception occur "in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of any security. "1 This phrase concluded
Rule lOb-5.
The Origin of the Phrase
When the tort of common-law Deceit was codified into the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934 as Section 10(b),8" "in connection with" was
tacked on almost as an afterthought. Arguably, an astute tort practi-
tioner would find it an unnecessary appendage, assuming that the deceit
would necessarily be practiced on a trader during the transaction.
80. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 955 (quoting Cherif, 933 F.2d at 409) (emphasis added).
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (emphasis added).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1995).
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The rationale for the SEC's addition of the phrase, however, was
clear. Common-law "deceit"-an ancient tort-covered the deception
of any trader in any of a multitude of trades, involving every conceiva-
ble kind of transaction, from the sale of a horse to the sale of a house.
The SEC wanted to be indubitably specific by adding an explicit
condemnation of Investor Deception in connection with a particular
class of transactions, the purchase or sale of securities. This phrase was
designed to guarantee to the Investor his right to know the true value of
the stock he was trading.
The Legislative History in a Nutshell
In one arresting account of the exact meaning of "in connection
with" from the pen of an original draftsman of the statute, all questions
about Theft from the Source evanesce.
Read the words of Milton Freeman, the "Father of the Proxy
Rules," and try to discern even the semblance of the Misappropriation
Theory:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my
office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call
from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and
Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the telephone with
Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in
Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company in
Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company from
his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them
that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings
are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming
year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs and
I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at
Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had
there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should be,
and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I
don't remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch.
We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule [Rule lOb-5] and they tossed it on the
table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner
Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?"
That is how it happened.83
83. Milton Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws:
Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 891, 922 (1967), quoted in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
479 F.2d 1277, 1290 n.32 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
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That should suffice for the intent of the Commission and the mean-
ing of codified common-law Deceit in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.
The Theorists and "In Connection With"
The Theorists seemed to be moving along quite well with the first
three Essentials of their consensus definition of the Theory. They
reached three clear-cut elements:
(1) The Gravamen: Theft of Information, (2) A Fiduciary Duty: Not
To Steal and (3) The Victim: Owner of Information.
These three all flowed with irrefutable logic from the clear wording
of the consensus definition:
(1) misappropriates material nonpublic information (2) by breaching
a duty arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence.84
But at this point in their reasoning, the Theorists were brought up
short: How could the (1) Theft of Information (2) By a Trusted Thief (3)
From the Owner of Information possibly be "in connection with" a
stock sale? No such sale was present. At each level, the Theorists faced
a brick wall: How connect the Theft of Information to a securities sale?
Clearly, no connection actually existed. But the Code provision was
mandatory: A connection must exist, or no Section 10(b).
The Theorists' Threefold Dilemma
Consider each of the first three Essentials in turn: (1) The Grava-
men of the Wrong according to the Theory was indisputably Theft of
Information. Stealing was the heart of the tort of Theft. But obviously,
the Theft of Information from an employer had no relation whatever to a
purchase or sale of a security. Therein lay the dilemma.
Next, (2) A Fiduciary Duty Not To Steal was clearly the obligation
burdening the Trusted Thief But once again, such a strange duty says
nil about a securities trade. The Theory's quandary deepened.
As to (3) The Victim: Owner of Information, the Theorists were
completely stymied. The "owner"- whether an employer or Susan of
the Supermarket, First Chicago or the unscathed Brits-knew absolutely
nothing about any stock trade, had no involvement whatsoever with any
defrauded Investors. The Victim presumably was only unhappy about
having his privacy invaded. The Theorists called it "stealing." An
actionable wrong, no doubt, but with No Relation to a Securities Trade.
So, at every turn, the Theorists were unable to find a "connection
with a purchase or sale of any security." A dilemma indeed.
84. Clark, 915 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added).
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The Genesis of the Dilemma
The question naturally arises as to just how the Theorists ever
wandered into this cul-de-sac. The answer is recent history, and is trace-
able-as with so many insider-trading ills-once again to that recent
deviant, Chiarella.8 5
As before, the deviation is referable to the Timorous Powell, who
could not bring himself to find Vincent Chiarella guilty of cheating his
sellers out of $30,000 by lying about the value of their stock. Why he
pitied the crooked Vinnie, and not the pitiable Innocents, remains
perplexing.
Justice Powell knew well that Vinnie was guilty. Both lower courts
had so found him. But the Supreme Court, by Mr. Justice Powell, nev-
ertheless said he committed no wrong, His conviction was reversed.86
Why?
The Court's answer had to be, and was: Vinnie had no Duty to tell
the Truth to his sellers, the public Investors. 7 So, with no Duty, a
Breach was impossible. Hence, no Liability. That holding has bedev-
illed the courts and the Commission ever since.
The disputes among the Justices in Chiarella lead us to doubt that it
will be the Supreme Court's last word on Rule lOb-5. 88
-Judge J. Skelly Wright, D.C. Circuit.
The Chiarella opinion is ... an enigma.89
-Judge R.K. Winter, Second Circuit.
The Commission, the Bench, and the Bar have been at wit's end for
the last eighteen years trying to circumvent Chiarella. But with no
success.
With Chiarella vividly in mind, the Theorists knew that all latter-
day Vinnies would henceforward not be liable for Insider Trading under
Powell's contortion of traditional Section-10(b) reasoning. On the other
hand, the Theorists also knew, viscerally, that these deceiving Vinnies
should be liable, and were, in truth, guilty.
The Theorists knew, for example, that James Herman O'Hagan was
guilty as sin when he lied to his sellers about the value of their stock, but
under Chiarella, O'Hagan owed them no Duty to disclose the truth and
was thus not liable. Therefore, the Theorists reasoned-instead of
attacking Chiarella head-on in a return to the SEC's Cady, Roberts-
that the route to circumventing Chiarella must be in some other gambit.
85. See Bayne, supra note 68. See also Bayne, supra note It, at 95-105.
86. See Chiarella 445 U.S. at 222.
87. See Bayne, supra note 68.
88. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1982) rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
89. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 551, 575 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Perhaps, they must have conjectured, liability could be cooked up some-
where else in the facts. Somewhere where the right-less Investor is not
involved at all, but where O'Hagan can be found guilty of something
else. Something else like the Theft of Information. Then, O'Hagan
would be liable and the Theory could call it Insider Trading.
Behold. Chiarella will be finessed and O'Hagan will be liable.
Thus the Dilemma arose. Now, what to do? How implement the
Theorists' reasoning? How could the deceiving traders of the future be
found guilty in spite of the Chiarella aberration? How bypass
Chiarella?
The Delicacy of the Dilemma
Undeniable logic left no room in the Theory, as it had thus devel-
oped, for a Wrong to the Investor during a Securities Transaction. The
only Wrong according to the Theory was Theft from an Owner of Infor-
mation. Yet, the Wrong still had to be a Wrong, but how could it be: In
connection with a Deceitful Trade?
The dilemma was ticklish. On the one hand, Section 10(b) was
bald: "In connection with" a securities trade. This statement was
decades old, enforced without dissent.
But, the Theory was equally bald: The Gravamen was Theft of
Information from the Victim, the "Owner" of Information. The channel
between these rocks was treacherous.
The Dilemma Solved
The Theorists were ingenious and up to the task. To implement
their conjectural reasoning, they devised a devious solution: Twist the
Theory in such a way that the latter-day Vinnies (1) Would be declared
liable for "Insider Trading"-thereby escaping the effect of Chiarella' s
guiltless Vinnie and the right-less Investor-but (2) Without any
requirement of Deception of an innocent Investor, thereby respecting
Chiarella. Which is to say: "With No Connection with a Deceitful
Trade."
But this meant: (1) Ditch the "in connection with," in fact and
practice, and (2) Do it surreptitiously, subtly. In other words, appear to
keep the phrase, but so word the language so that only jesuitical insight
would discern the ditching.
The Theorists accordingly approached their solution in two steps:
(a) The In-Fact Ditching of "In Connection With" and (b) The Meaning-
less Restoration of "In Connection With."
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(a) The In-Fact Ditching of "In Connection With"
The result of the Theorists' duplicity-and the first of the two steps
in the solution of the dilemma-appeared in the Theory's last segment,
Item (4) of the consensus definition:
[T]he misappropriation theory . . . authorize[s] the criminal convic-
tion of a person ... (4) "regardless of whether he owed any duties to
the shareholders of the traded stock."90
What is the full implication of this last tenet of the Theory? How does it
help to solve the Dilemma? What is the true meaning of this Item (4) of
the Theory?
The Translation of Item (4) into English
At first reading, a layman would find the last clause either totally
incomprehensible or in need of a word-for-word parsing. The obvious
present course is to parse Item (4). With that, a sensible analysis of its
meaning will be possible.
The original phrase reads: The "Insider" is liable,
(4) "regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of
the traded stock." 91
In this analysis, take each segment of the phrase in reverse order: (i)
"The Shareholders of the Traded Stock;" (ii) "He owed any duties;"
and (iii) "Regardless of whether".
(i) "The Shareholders of the Traded Stock"
Why, or how-purposeful obfuscation?-the Theorists ever came
up with their wording of Item (4) is difficult to fathom. The Chiarellas,
Boeskys, O'Hagans, and other Insider Traders of the world, all traded in
a two-party securities transaction. The only party on the other side of
the deal was either the owner of the stock traded or the about-to-be
owner of the stock traded. That was the whole of it. So, why call the
'Investor' "the shareholders of the traded stock"? Who other than an
'Investor' could he be?
If the Theorists were referring to the nontrading "shareholders of
the traded stock," it was an irrelevant concern since they were not par-
ties to the Insider Trade and were totally out of the picture.
The meaning was obvious: Trading opposite O'Hagan was: The
owner of the traded stock. He was a current Investor or an about-to-be
Investor. In any event, "The Shareholders of the Traded Stock" were
none other than the public Investors, long protected by the Securities




Acts. The Investor was the primary object of the solicitude of Section
10(b).
Item (4) would necessarily now read: The 'Insider' is liable,
(4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the public Investor.
(ii) "He Owed Any Duties"
This clause is relatively straightforward. Nevertheless, the Theory
might better have said "The Insider," instead of "he," since Insider
Trading is the tort involved. In an Insider Trade, only an Insider, per-
force, could be the one who "owed any duties." Thus, much clearer to
say "the Insider."
The plural, "duties," moreover, is superfluous, inasmuch as the
only duty under any theory of Insider Trading law is a lone Duty of
Disclosure.
A logical expatiation of "any duty" must be inserted at this junc-
ture. Implicit in the concept of "duty" is the first-semester-Torts princi-
ple that a putative tortfeasor can never be held liable for a Breach if
there is no Duty he could breach.
Consequently, if he cannot be guilty of a Breach of a Duty to Dis-
close, he cannot be guilty of Deception.
And finally, if Deception is absent, no Harm can possibly follow.
Therefore, if no Duty, no Breach. If no Breach, no Deception. If
no Deception, no Harm.
These changes, captious as they might appear, would make for eas-
ier reading, especially for longtime securities-law observers. Item (4)
thus becomes: The 'Insider' is liable,
(4) regardless of whether the Insider owed any duty to disclose,
deceived or harmed the public Investor.
(iii) "Regardless of Whether"
But here are the key words of Item (4). In this lone preposition,
"regardless of whether," the entire meaning of the phrase-even the
entire meaning of the Original Theory-becomes startlingly clear. In it
lies a total negation of all that precedes it. In fact, the translation, or
understanding, of that prepositional phrase becomes a real revelation,
even to one adept in securities law.
The surest approach toward testing the phrase is the ultimate Amer-
ican authority, Webster's Unabridged. Webster's achieves this under-
standing in two steps.
First, with the definition of the adverbial constitutent:
2regardless . . . adv : without regard to impeding elements (as of
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prudence, expense, or effort) .... 92
Webster's in its abridged form adds an emphasizing note:
2regardless adv (1872) : despite everything <went ahead with their
plans [regardless]> 93
This adverb is the substantive element of the phrase and aptly
expresses the thrust and meaning of Item (4). The definition provided
by Webster's could well adapt to the Theory and loosely paraphrase
Item (4) in these words:
The misappropriation theory authorizes the criminal conviction of a
person (4) despite everything else, irrespective of impeding elements,
such as the absence of any duty to disclose to, deception of and harm
to, the Investor.
Next, Webster's attaches the adverb to the preposition used by the
Theory, and thereby yields a fuller appreciation of the strong impact of
the phrase on the exact meaning of Item (4). The newer abridged Web-
ster's reiterates the Unabridged and adds one pertinent example:
regardless of prep (1784) : without taking into account <accepts all
regardless of age>; also : in spite of <regardless of our mistakes>94
Both meanings ascribed to "regardless of" by Webster's are apro-
pos to the Theory's definition, and both come to the same result: James
Herman O'Hagan is liable for Insider Trading in any case, even if he
owed no duty to his trading partner, did not deceive him and did not
harm him. O'Hagan is liable, no matter what!
O'Hagan's guilt is present "in spite of" the presence or absence of
an obligation to the public Investor with whom he traded. Put yet
another way: The Thief's liability for Insider Trading is fully established
"without taking into account" any duty to the Investor. Or deception.
Or harm.
Whether or Not
When joined with the preposition "regardless of," the conjunction
"whether" is an intensifier. As Webster's explains:
2whether conj (bef. 12c)-used as a function word usu. with correla-
tive or or with or whether to indicate ... (3) alternative conditions or
possibilities <see me no more, [whether] he be dead or no -Shak.>
..- whether or no or whether or not: in any case
9 5
Tack "whether or not" onto the end of the translation of "regard-
92. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1911 (Philip Babcock Gove, ed.
1986).
93. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 984 (10th ed. 1997).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1346.
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less of" and the intensity of "in spite of" or "without taking into
account" becomes even more emphatic. The full impact of the consen-
sus definition now becomes clearer. A further paraphrase of the Theory
is now be warranted:
The misappropriation theory authorizes the criminal conviction of a
person (4) without taking into account whether or not the Insider
owed any duty to disclose to the Investor, deceived the Investor, or
harmed the Investor with whom he traded the stock. Liability is pres-
ent in any case.
Viewed from the aspect of the right flowing from the duty, the The-
ory finds it irrelevant whether an Investor in a securities transaction has
any right to the truth about the value of the stock he trades. The liability
is present "regardless of whether" the trading partner possessed any
rights or suffered great damages.
With that, the Theorists had solved the first half of their dilemma:
The "in connection with" had been effectively emasculated. The phrase
has eliminated all of the constituents of the "securities transaction"-
namely, duty to disclose to, deception of and harm to an Investor-and
hence thereby eliminated the "securities transaction" itself.
Therefore, the phrase was rendered, in practical effect, operatively
inapplicable: The Insider is liable, even with no connection with a
securities transaction involving duty, deception and harm.
The Emasculation Analyzed
Of all the five Circuit opinions, Judge Luttig's was the most per-
ceptive and reasoned. Bryan displayed historical depth, and a rare
insight into the meaning and purpose of Section 10(b), as well as the law
of Insider Trading.
For these reasons, Judge Luttig's understanding of the Theory's
scuttling of "in connection with" deserves some special attention. His
analysis, although pursuing a different tack, adds a further dimension to
the reasoning elaborated thus far.
The Untenable Dichotomy
Bryan-which was followed virtually verbatim by O'Hagan in its
analysis of the elimination of "in connection with "-highlights the The-
ory's mistreatment of the phrase by exposing a dichotomy made by the
Theory, when the Code permits no such dichotomy at all.9 6
In essence, the misappropriation theory .. .artificially divides into
two discrete requirements-[I] a fiduciary breach and [2] a
96. See Bayne, The Awakening, supra note 72.
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purchase or sale of securities-the single indivisible requirement of
deception upon the purchaser or seller of securities .... 97
In this paragraph, the two Circuits, the Fourth and Eighth, made the
controlling point: The Theory separated the inseparable in the Code
into two disparate parts. First, the Theory posited a Breach of some
kind of Fiduciary Duty.
Then, second, the Thief at some later time and place engaged in
some kind of a securities transaction that was without deceit on a buyer
or seller, was honest, did not at all involve Insider Trading, was totally
distinct from the Theft by the 'disloyal' Thief and did not wrong an
Investor.
The two Circuits explain this fallacious dichotomy:
In [the false dichotomy], the theory effectively eliminates the require-
ment that a person in some way connected to a securities transaction
be deceived, allowing conviction not only where the "defrauded" per-
son has no connection with a securities transaction, but where no
investor or market participant has been deceived.9 8
Chestman, by the Meskill Majority, had earlier been explicit in
stressing this dichotomy. Meskill cited in support the Second Circuit's
first Theory opinion, Newman:
In contrast to Chiarella and Dirks, the misappropriation theory does
not require that the buyer or seller of securities be defrauded. 99
Emphasizing the point, Chestman continued, this time relying on
the Supreme Court:
[W]e have held that the predicate act of fraud may be perpetrated on
the source of the nonpublic information, even though the source may
be unaffiliated with the buyer or seller of securities.'0 0
Bryan had earlier stressed the total lack of connection between the
earlier Theft and the later unrelated securities transaction:
Even though ["Butch" Bryan] owes no duty of disclosure to the pur-
chaser or seller of the securities, the completed fraud (i.e., the misap-
propriation) is deemed to be "in connection with the purchase or sale
of [a] security," because the misappropriated information is thereaf-
ter used in a securities transaction.' 10
The Fourth Circuit Bryan removes any doubts by reiterating the
Theory's rejection of the connection between the breach of loyalty and
the securities trade:
97. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 950 (emphasis added).
98. Id. (emphasis added).
99. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566 (emphasis added). Newman so states, twice. 664 F.2d at 617.
100. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566 (emphasis added).
101. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944-45 (emphasis added).
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The source of the nonpublic information [the Victim of the Theft]
need not ... be in any way connected to or even interested in the
purchase or sale of securities.' °2
One now is forced to ask why, in light of Item (4), the Theory
bothered to insert Item (3) at all? The answer of course is patent. Not
because of logic, but because of Section 10(b).
Judge Luttig, therefore, in the end reached the same conclusion: In
actuality these words scuttled the phrase. In effect, the Theory ignored,
bypassed, finessed-advertently emasculated-the statutory "in connec-
tion with a purchase or sale of any security."
Now, the Theorists must take their second duplicitous step towards
solution of the dilemma.
(b) The Meaningless Restoration of "In Connection With"
Granted, by the difficult-to-discern-but nonetheless very effec-
tive-elimination of "in connection with" in Item (4) of the Theory, the
Theorists had seemingly solved their dilemma, at least partially, But
they still faced a mountainous obstacle: Section 10(b) and its mandate
"in connection with."
This last anomaly of the Original Theory would never have arisen
had not the Theorists been driven to do something to give at least lip
service to that imperative proviso of Section 10(b): The deception must
be "in connection with" a securities transaction. So, what was the lip
service?
To give apparent adherence to this proviso, the Theorists decided to
insert a hoped-for route around their last obstacle. The route they chose
was a naive addition to their definition of the Theory. This disarming
insertion:
"(3) uses that information in a securities transaction"
certainly should satisfy the "in connection with" of Section 10(b). Item
(3) could scarce be more explicit.
More to the point, the phrase was harmless enough. Indeed, in fact
it was totally innocuous, since Item (4) immediately rendered it mean-
ingless. As meaningless, insertion of Item (3) would not detract from
the real heart of the Theory expressed in the first three Essentials:
(1) The Gravamen: Theft of Information, (2) A Fiduciary Duty: Not
To Steal, and (3) The Victim: Owner of Information.
And the obvious advantage of this seemingly explicit statement-
meaningless as in truth it was-was its firm inclusion of the Code-man-
102. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567.
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dated "in a securities transaction." This "forthright" phrase would cer-
tainly fool the SEC, the Bench, the Bar, and, needless to say, Academe.
The only effect of Item (3): The Insider did have to go out, some-
time or other, and engage in a meaningless purchase or sale of stock and
somehow or other use the information. How the information would be
of use-since it in no way harmed the Investor-is not explained. Per-
haps it attracted him to the stock or called his attention to it.
With that, the lip service was performed, the Theorists' duty done.
Which concludes the exposition of the negative aspect of the Theory's
successful circumvention of the Code proviso "in connection with" a
securities trade.
But a short reflection of later relevance is in order:
The Consummation of the Fraud
In its elaborate rationalization of Section 10(b), what was the The-
ory's core concept? What lay at the Theory's heart?
Here is the Theory's ruling precept: That the consummation of the
Deception, the Fraud, of Insider Trading is not to be found, under the
Theory, in the securities transaction. The Wrong lies not in the stock
sale.
But that only tells what the Wrong was not in connection with,
where the Fraud was not consummated. The first subsection-(1) No
Relation to a Securities Trade-therefore has been concluded. But that
was the negative aspect.
Briefly now, positively, what was the Wrong really in connection
with? Where was the Fraud really consummated?
(2) In a Theft of Information
This leads to a further revealing ratiocination, and to the exact
locus-viewed positively-of the consummation of the fraud as speci-
fied by the Theory.
The reasoning begins with a basic question: If the Violation
according to the Theory is not in a Wrong to the Investor, where does
the Violation lie? A simple syllogism provides the answer.
According to the Theory, the Fraud is the Misappropriation of
Information, but the Thief stole Information from the Owner. Therefore,
the Fraud is "in connection with" the Theft of Information.
The Theorists' reasoning is now complete. Since the Investor was
not injured by the Thief and since the Owner was injured by the Thief,
the consummation of the Fraud must be in the Theft from the Owner.
And not in the Deceit of the Investor.
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Since the Theft was perpetrated With No Connection With a Deceit-
ful Trade, the consummation of the Fraud was perforce "in connection
with the Theft of Information."
These four Essentials of the Misappropriation Theory as adjudi-
cated by the Five battling Circuits-the Theory that sent James Herman
O'Hagan to jail, and came up on certiorari-could be assembled in a
visual display for later use in the forthcoming juxtaposition with Justice
Ginsburg's New Theory.
II. THE NEW THEORY OF GINSBURG
The Misappropriation Theory that sent James Herman O'Hagan to
jail has now been definitively defined. This was the Original Theory
that three Circuits half-heartedly rubber-stamped. And that two Circuits
cogently ruled was inconsistent with Section 10(b) and the long-estab-
lished law of Insider Trading.
Now the task is the synthesis of Justice Ginsburg's "'imaginative'
exercise of constructing [her] own misappropriation theory from whole
cloth."'10 3
Justice Ginsburg did not openly avow her intent to abandon the
Original Theory that came up on certiorari. That would have been
instantaneously condemned. Rather, subtlety was the route to take, a
more "imaginative" solution: Simply eating away at the Original The-
ory and inserting the components of the New Theory unobtrusively into
a mass of meandering. In the end, the New Theory would be, in fact,
woven "from whole cloth". But only meditative scrutiny would easily
detect the fact.
Such scrutiny is now in order. Aided by the impugning insights of
Justice Thomas and the support of Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice,
the New Theory can be successfully constructed, and later laid alongside
the Original Theory.
Analysis will reveal that the two "theories" are poles apart and that
Justice Thomas will be proven correct: The New Theory does indeed
have "a dispositive flaw." Justice Thomas was unequivocal:
Whether the ... new theory has merit, we cannot possibly tell on
the record before us ... because, until today, the theory has never
existed. In short, the.., new theory is simply not presented by this
case, and cannot form the basis for upholding [James Herman
O'Hagan's] convictions.104
103. United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199, 2224 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
104. Id. at 2224-25 (emphasis added).
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The difference between the 'theories' is black and white.
"The New and Improved Misappropriation Theory" ''"5
The approach to the synthesis will be twofold. First, the New The-
105. Id. at 2225 (emphasis added).
A Fiduciary Duty:
Not To Steal
With No Connection To
a Deceitiul Trade
INSIDER TRADING
ory will be presented in an Amalgam, in Ginsburg's exact words, col-
lated from her Opinion. The New Theory will then stand out in stark
simplicity.
Second, the distinct elements of Ginsburg's "novel" Theory will
aptly serve as topic headings for supporting commentary. Under each
topic heading, moreover, will be grouped further direct quotations from
the majority opinion, with occasional references by Justice Ginsburg to
the Government Brief and to the Oral Argument.
This corroborating annotation will confirm each sentence of the
Amalgam and remove any doubt as to the legitimacy of the succinct
synthesis and the authenticity of this "'imaginative' exercise" that cre-
ated a New Theory 'from whole cloth." What has been hidden in a
mishmash of ramblings in the opinion itself will stand forth, concise, in
full sunlight.
The Synthesized Amalgam
Unencumbered by commentary and supporting Ginsburg quota-
tions, the essentials of the New Theory-next to be set off against the
Original Misappropriation Theory of the Circuits-constitute an intelli-
gible and surprisingly reasonable definition of Insider Trading. These
are Ginsburg's own words:
The Amalgam
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
(1) Trading on the basis of nonpublic, confidential informa-
tion, (2) By an outsider to a corporation
(3) To gain no-risk profits-that is, (4) the Investor's disad-
vantage stems from contrivance, not luck and cannot be
overcome with research or skill-
(5) Which is a self-serving abuse that will affect the corpora-
tion's security price when revealed to Investors,
(6) With resultant harm to Investors.
(7) Finally, the fraud is consummated only when he uses the
information through securities transactions.1 "6
106. The citations that follow document the individual components of this Ginsburg Amalgam
as they appear verbatim in her O'Hagan opinion. To correlate the context and content of these
phrases is the remaining task of this Article. At this point in the argument, the reader will only be
diverted by an attempt to understand the entire correlation on the basis of these citations alone.
The individual components of Ginsburg's Amalgam are repeated below in boldface, followed by
the citation and quotation from the opinion.
(1) Trading on the basis of nonpublic, confidential information, (2) By an
outsider to a corporation
See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 ("[T]he misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of
nonpublic information by a corporate 'outsider' . . . who [has] confidential information ... .
(3) To gain no-risk profits -
1998]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
The supporting excerpts from the opinion and the explanatory com-
mentary will treat the four Essentials: A. The Gravamen: Nondisclo-
sure to the Investor. B. A Simple Duty: To Disclose to the Investor. C.
The Victim: The Deceived Investor. D. In Connection With a Deceitful
Trade.
Throughout the ensuing analysis, all the words of the Amalgam will
be highlighted by bold typeset to indicate the source of the Amalgam's
words, and to give the context in which Justice Ginsburg spoke.
A. The Gravamen: Nondisclosure to the Investor
The gravamen of Insider Trading in the view of all securities ana-
lysts is Deception, either practiced on (1) the so-called "Owner" of the
Information, according to the Original Theory, or (2) on the Investor, as
the Traditionalists and general public have always held. Therefore, the
question is now: Where does the New Theory locate this gravamen?
The Ginsburg Amalgam speaks directly to this question.
As the word "gravamen" suggests, the answer will reveal the most
significant tenet of the New Theory, the linchpin holding the whole
together, the starting point, necessarily, in assembling the other three
Essentials.
The importance of this question is heightened by the antipolar
views as to the locus of the Deception, the heart of Insider Trading. Is
the Deceit on the person who "owns" the purloined Information? Or is
the Investor, who trades with the O'Hagan, the TGS Insider, the
Id. at 2209 ("[T]o gain no-risk profits through the purchase or sale of securities").
that is (4) the Investor's disadvantage stems from contrivance, not luck and
cannot be overcome with research or skill -
Id. at 2210 ("An investor's informational disadvantage... stems from contrivance, not luck; it is
a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with research or skill.")
(5) Which is a self-serving
Id. at 2207 ("Under this theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a principal's
information").
abuse that will affect the corporation's security price when revealed to
Investors,
Id. ("The misappropriation theory is thus designed to 'protect ... against abuses ... that will
affect th[e] corporation's security price when revealed"') (quoting Brief for United States at 14).
(6) With resultant harm to Investors
Id. at 2209 (("'deceit can be practiced ... with resultant harm to another person or group of
persons' ") .... A misappropriator ... simultaneously harms members of the investing public.")
(quoting Aldave, 13 Hofstra L. Rev. at 120).
(7) Finally, the fraud is consummated only when he uses the information
through securities transactions.
Id. ("[Tithe fiduciary's fraud is consummated.., when ... he uses the information to purchase or




Chiarella, the deceived one? The answer is the most basic, in the present
context, in the law of Insider Trading.
Justice Ginsburg began her answer at the earliest point in her opin-
ion. She laid the foundation stone-the opening words of the Amal-
gam-with a definition of Insider Trading that would have been
acceptable to all Traditionalists, in every case on the subject from the
Supreme Court's Strong v. Repide °7 in 1909 through the latest Cady,
Roberts progeny in the 1980s.108
In this very beginning in defining her New Theory, Justice Gins-
burg aptly expresses its nucleus:
[T]he misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of non-
public information by a corporate "outsider"....lO9
In these words, the Justice has embodied two important constituents of
the tort of Insider Trading: (1) Trading by the Insider with an Investor,
(2) On the basis of undisclosed-nonpublic, not revealed to the pub-
lic-information.
Thus far the Justice has only stated the prohibited act. She has not
commented on its intrinsic evil.
Following this introduction, the Justice explains her theory in
greater detail, building on the foundation:
The misappropriation theory is thus designed to "protec[t] the integ-
rity of the securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a cor-
poration who have access to confidential information that will
affect th[e] corporation's security price when revealed .... 110
These words advance her definition considerably. With them, Justice
Ginsburg begins to analyze the inherent iniquity in the bald act of an
O'Hagan merely "trading" with the public innocents "on the basis of
nonpublic information."
In this explanatory sentence, the Justice compressed two additional
and salient elements of the tort: (1) Insider Trading is an "abuse"; and
(2) The undisclosed- "confidential," not "revealed"-price paid by the
Insider has been unstated, therefore materially misstated, and hence did
not reflect the true value of the security traded.
107. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
108. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). The progeny: Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d
824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 594 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.
1979); United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 445 U.S. 222 (1980);
Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); and SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). See
generally Bayne, supra note 11, at 93-135.
109. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
110. Id. (emphasis added, to indicate phrases from the Amalgam).
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A Corrupt Practice
Justice Ginsburg's use of the word "abuse" was peculiarly apt.
Consider Webster's:
abuse... n... : 1: a corrupt practice or custom 2: improper use or
treatment: misuse ... 3 obs: a deceitful act :deception . ... "'
The Justice's choice of the word "abuse" was superb, and totally
appropriate in expressing the core element of the tort, Deception, while
also describing it as a "corrupt practice," and an "improper use" of
information to which the Investor had a right.
Material to an Informed Trade
Justice Ginsburg buries in this pregnant statement a prominent req-
uisite of the "deceit" tort: Materiality. Disclosure of the stock's true
value "will affect the corporation's security price." Undisclosed, mate-
rial deception results.
The Compendium " 2-first propounded seven years ago-antici-
pated the Justice in the definition of the essential Information in an hon-
est disclosure:
Information of any kind, reliable not conjectural, nonpublic, rele-
vant and material to an informed trade, from any source and not
necessarily misappropriated .... "'
In an expatiation on her position, the Justice virtually paraphrased
the Compendium, and further rounded out her Amalgam:
An investor's informational disadvantage ... stems from contri-
vance, not luck; it is a disadvantage that cannot be overcome with
research or skill .... 114
Emphasizing Ginsburg's obvious point: The Materiality to an
informed trade by an Investor could be of no concern whatsoever to the
Source of that information.
Justice Ginsburg makes it clear that the undisclosed value of the
security was materially misstated and would affect the market accord-
ingly. She thus, she explains why O'Hagan nets $4 million "when" the
"confidential information" is "revealed"- that is, when the true value
is actually disclosed. Furthermore, she consciously makes no reference
to the so-called source of the Information in her explanation of the
nature of the "abuse."
Note that a major segment of the Amalgam has come from these
111. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 47 (1988).
112. Bayne, supra note 16, at 352-53.
113. Id. at 353.
114. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2210 (emphasis added).
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Ginsburg statements. In fact, these alone could suffice to define the
New Theory. But Justice Ginsburg buttressed her basic enunciation
throughout her Opinion.
The "Nondisclosure to Whom?" Emphasized
In a matter absolutely integral to the question of "Deceit of
Whom?," the Justice makes clear that her New Theory centers on (1)
Nondisclosure to an Investor, (2) In a Stock Sale, (3) With an Investor.
She explains:
Under this theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a
principal's information to purchase or sell securities [is outlawed
by Section 10(b)].ll 5
Passim throughout her Opinion, Justice Ginsburg uses words such
as "when revealed" and "undisclosed" to fortify the "nondisclosure"
element of the New Theory. The constant use of "nonpublic" and "con-
fidential" are, of themselves, ample evidence of a clear intent to incor-
porate nondisclosure into the essence of the New Theory.
To the Investor
But the more serious element of the "Nondisclosure to the Inves-
tor," is her nexus of the Deceit to the Investor. After all, the presence of
Deception is postulated by the Original Theory. Her connection of the
Deception to the Investor, therefore, is crucial. Latent in this clipt
remark is that very nexus:
A fiduciary... "secretly convert[s] the ... information for personal
gain."'16
Very little reasoning is necessary to penetrate the Ginsburg mean-
ing in "Secret use of information for personal gain." First, of course,
"secret" is just another bolster word to express the "misstatement"
aspect of Insider Trading. If the "statement" were known to the trading
partner-if it were not "secret "-it could scarce deceive him, and hence
be a "misstatement."
But, second, is the key phrase "for personal gain." Certainly, the
Insider Trader is not going to get any "personal gain" in a stock trade
without deceiving the Investor with whom he trades. Clearly, the Owner
has no connection with a stock trade that would yield dollars from the
Owner to the Insider. The Owner lost no dollars that would give per-
sonal gain to the Insider.
Justice Ginsburg, of course, does persist in her lip service to the
115. Id. at 2207 (emphasis added, as above).
116. Id. at 2208 (quoting Brief for the United States at 17) (emphasis added).
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Original Theory. She would be relegated to oblivion if she did not.
However, continued scrutiny uncovers her operative concept of the law
of Insider Trading, in contradistinction to her "speculative" or "theoreti-
cal" obeisance to the Original Theory.
Justice Ginsburg's clear junction of the Deceit with the Investor
appears early in her Opinion. She refers to her New Theory as
addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic information.through
the purchase or sale of securities.117
This brief excerpt elicits four pertinent reflections, all establishing
her nexus between Deception and Investor:
(1) Only'two parties participate in a "purchase or sale of securi-
ties," the Trader-a Chiarella, Milken, Boesky, or O'Hagan-and the
Investor with whom he trades.
(2) The only way a Vinnie Chiarella or a James Herman O'Hagan
could "capitalize on nonpublic information" would be to lie to his
buyer or seller-the Investor on the other side of the deal-by not dis-
closing the true value of the traded stock and thus cheating him, for
example, to the tune of $4 million.
(3) Were the information public, that is, known to all and not
secret, Vinnie or James Herman could not capitalize on it, because
everyone would be equal. With a level playing field, only "skill," mar-
ket acumen, savoir, would be rewarded. The "investor's advantage"
would not accordingly "stem[ ] from contrivance," and hence offer no
opportunity on which to "capitalize."
(4) The most important indicium of the nexus between the Deceit
and the Investor is the phrase: "through the purchase or sale of securi-
ties." The word "through" in this context, denotes "by means of,"
"during," or, as Justice Scalia appositely puts it:
[T]he manipulation or deception of a party to a securities
transaction. "8
Or, in Justice Ginsburg's words: "[T]he . . . deception of a[n Investor
through] a securities transaction."
Justice Thomas to the Ramparts
Justice Thomas, in his sustained expos6 of the Ginsburg New The-
ory, makes this same point:
[T]he Commission and the majority... require a more integral con-
nection between the fraud and the securities transaction [i.e., the
Investor]. The majority states, for example, that the misappropriation
117. Id. at 2207 (emphasis added).
118. Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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theory applies to undisclosed misappropriation of confidential infor-
mation "for securities trading purposes," ... thus seeming to require
a particular intent by the misappropriator [to join the 'fraud" with
the Investor]. 1 19
The Commission, on whom Justice Ginsburg occasionally relies in
building her "novel Theory," was equally prepared to require Deceit on
the Investor-undoubtedly an atavistic return to its heyday of Cady,
Roberts rationality-and did so state that position, as Justice Thomas
points out:
The Commission . . . argues that the misappropriation theory . . .
"depends on an inherent connection between the deceptive conduct
and the purchase and sale of a security" [with an Investor]. 2o
Justice Thomas builds on his contention with further support. He quotes
the Government replying to Justice Scalia during Oral Argument:
[Mr. Dreeben:] "[T]he only value of this information for personal
profit for [James Herman O'Hagan] was to take it and profit in the
securities market by trading on it."
'121
Finish that sentence: "by failing to disclose to the Investor the true
value of his stock, that is, to lie, and net $4 million." That is what
"trading on it" means. Patently, absent the deception of the Investor as
to the true value of his stock, the Insider could not be guaranteed "per-
sonal profit." In short, here was the classic Insider Trading of history,
dating back to 1909 and Strong v. Repide. Here was the Deceit action
enshrined in Section 10(b) in 1934, and crystallized by the SEC "case of
first impression," 122 Cady, Roberts.
Justice Thomas realized that the Government was admitting-and
Justice Ginsburg was endorsing the admission and incorporating it into
her New Theory-that the consummation of the Deception lay in the
Nondisclosure to the Investor. Armed with that realization, Justice
Thomas hammered the point-and hammered as well the poor Deputy
Solicitor General, Michael Dreeben, on whom had been foisted the
thankless chore of defending the undefendable-time after time.
Justice Thomas quotes Mr. Dreeben to stress his point:
[Mr. Dreeben]: [I]t is the use of the information that enables the
profits, pure and simple. There would be no opportunity to engage in
profit .... 123
119. Id. at 2221 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
120. Id. (quoting Brief for United States at 21) (emphasis added).
121. Id. at 2222 (emphasis added).
122. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
123. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2222 (quoting from the Oral Argument) (Thomas, J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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Justice Thomas would translate that to read: "Enables the fleecing in the
amount of $4 million." Only in the New Theory would illicit loot of $4
million be called "profits."
Note too that the Government stressed that the Deception was per-
petrated on the Investor, "pure and simple." But even more telling was
Dreeben's use of the word 'only.' Justice Thomas beats that drum
through several pages.
What Justice Ginsburg means when she relies on the use of
"only"-and which in turn the Government means and which Justice
Thomas repeatedly emphasizes that the New Theory means-is that the
Insider Trader would have "no opportunity to engage in profit" by
cheating the 'Owner' of the Information. Obviously, "profits" have
never been conceived to flow from the Owner to the Insider.
The "only value" for personal profit, the only "opportunity to
engage in profit, "-that is, "to engage in looting the innocent Investor"
would be "in a securities transaction" by, in Justice Scalia's words,
"deception of a party to a securities transaction."' 24
Thus does Justice Ginsburg explicitly exclude the only other
"opportunity to engage in profit" conceivable in the present context,
namely in the Deception of the Owner.
Justice Thomas is unremitting. This time, he hammers the Govern-
ment's Brief on the same point:
[T]he "misappropriated information had personal value to [Mr.
O'Hagan] only because of its utility in securities trading."'2 5
These euphemisms are exquisite. Secret, confidential information,
known only to O'Hagan, undisclosed to his trading partner, has "util-
ity." As a gun has 'utility' in a murder? Again, notice the stress on
"only." Its "only" "utility" is in Deceit of the Investor. No "personal
profits" were "enabled" in a deal with the source of the Information.
Rather, "only" in a deal with the Investor.
Note also that this line of reasoning successfully removes "profits"
from the act of Theft from the Source to the Deceit of the Investor. This
is a focus of the entire analysis and of great import to the later juxtaposi-
tion of the two theories.
At this juncture in the Oral Argument, Justice Souter climbs on the
bandwagon (prompting queries as to why he disappeared when the Court
voted 6 to 3) and Justice Thomas welcomes him by quoting his question
to the Government:
124. Id. at 2220 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 2221 (quoting Brief for United States at 21) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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"[Justice Souter]: So what you're saying is.... in this case the misap-
propriation can only be of relevance, or is of substantial relevance,
... with reference to the purchase of securities.
"[Mr. Dreeben]: Exactly."' 126
Again, the removal of the gravamen from Theft to Investor Deception.
Although Justice Thomas continued to pursue the point, for present
purposes, the conclusion is manifest:
The New Theory outlaws trading on nonpublic, confidential informa-
tion, undisclosed to the Investor.
The Thomas Summation
Toward the end of his cogent dissent, Justice Thomas attempts to
encapsulate this first New Theory Essential: The Gravamen: Nondisclo-
sure to the Investor. Unfortunately, he does not quite round out his
thought. However, that omission can be filled in for him.
The majority's approach is misleading in this case because it glosses
over the fact that the supposed threat to fair and honest markets,
investor confidence, and market integrity comes not from the sup-
posed fraud in this case [i.e., Theft from the Source, the Owner], but
from the mere fact that the information used by O'Hagan was
nonpublic. 1
27
Had Justice Thomas concluded, his sentence would have read like
this: "That is, that the information was not disclosed to the Investor by
O'Hagan, and was the cause of $4 million in illegal losses to the Inves-
tor," and "personal profit for"'128 O'Hagan.
Justice Thomas could have expatiated: This Nondisclosure to the
Investor, the Deceit, induced the Investor to sell at an unfair and dishon-
est price, thereby losing $4 million. Certainly that would also cause the
Investor to lose his "confidence" in "market integrity," in "fair and
honest markets."
Thomas explains further:
Even if it is true that trading on nonpublic information hurts the pub-
lic, it is true whether or not there is any deception of the source of the
information. 2 9
Where or how O'Hagan got his secret information matters nil to the lied-
126. Id. at 2222 (quoting the Oral Argument) (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 2225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
128. Id. at 2222 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment inpart and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
129. Id. at 2225-26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
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to Investor. The Investor's only concern is that the Deceit cost him $4
million. Once again, Ginsburg moves the Deception from the Theft to
the Investor.
B. A Simple Duty: To Disclose to the Investor
The Amalgam
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
(1) Trading on the basis of nonpublic, confidential informa-
tion, (2) By an outsider to a corporation
(3) To gain no-risk profits-that is, (4) the Investor's disad-
vantage stems from contrivance, not luck and cannot be
overcome with research or skill-
(5) Which is a self-serving abuse that will affect the corpora-
tion's security price when revealed to Investors,
(6) With resultant harm to Investors.
(7) Finally, the fraud is consummated only when he uses the
information through securities transactions.130
As every student of Torts learns early in the course, the point of
logical embarkation is invariably Duty. Then Breach. Thence on to
Proximate Cause, Damages, and finally Defenses.
This approach is invariable, because it is dictated by the intrinsic
nature of a tort. Thus, the Breach necessarily flows from and is logi-
cally dependent on the Duty. In fact, the nature of the Breach is so
completely determined by the Duty breached, as to possess no character-
istics not formed by the Duty itself. 3 '
Why then, the question arises, did this scholarly inquisition into the
Duty and Breach of the New Theory give the Violation of Section 10(b)
precedence over the Duty as specified in the Code? Why not follow
first-semester Torts and begin with Duty?
The answer is referable to the practicalities of Insider Trading and
the Victim's preoccupation with the $4 million in losses caused by the
immediate Breach-the lie about the stock's value-rather than with the
more remote Duty forbidding it: Not Deceive a fellow trader. The inno-
cent Investors thought first of the Breach that damaged them. The Duty
behind the breach was of no pressing concern.
Accordingly, the New Theory thought first of the Breach and laid
out its principal elements in detail, as the Amalgam illustrates.
Because of this intrinsic interdependence of Duty and Breach, the
present task is already ninety percent complete. The nature of the
130. See supra note 105.
131. See Bayne, Primer, supra note 21, at 204-05. See also DAVID COWAN BAYNE, S.J.,
CONSCIENCE, OBLIGATION, AND THE LAW 133-34 (1966).
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Breach is completely reflective-necessarily and essentially-of the
nature of the consequent Duty. Due to this essential interdependence-
the Breach is a mirror reflection of the Duty breached-this analysis of
the Duty requires only a glance at the mirror.
In that mirror, the face of the Breach can be seen in full detail in the
gravamen of the Wrong, the first of the Essentials: The Breach of the
Duty to Disclose to the Investor.
Elementary logic moves the reasoning inexorably from the Viola-
tion of Section 10(b) to the Duty that the Violation violated. Since the
gravamen of the Wrong is Nondisclosure to the Investor, the Duty per-
force is to Disclose to the Investor, to tell him the truth about the value
of the stock traded. From the malefaction Nondisclosure, the illation to
the Duty of Disclosure can readily be made.
The Twin Alterations in Ginsburg's 'Duty'
"[I]n the 'imaginative' exercise of constructing [her] own misap-
propriation theory from whole cloth," Justice Ginsburg selectively alters
both the thrust and the nature of the Duty to Disclose as defined by the
Original Theory.132 These two alterations accordingly form logical cate-
gories for commentary on this second Essential of the New Theory: The
Duty to Disclose to the Investor.
As to the thrust of her New Theory, Justice Ginsburg no longer
concentrates on the obligation to the "Owner" of the Information. The
thrust now is toward the Duty to the Investor.
At the same time, the New Theory ignores completely, even
directly disavows, a mainstay of the Original Theory, the Fiduciary
Duty. Gone is all talk of a "trusted" agent, attorney, or confidant who
succumbs to snooping, or as the Theorists call it, "thievery." The very
nature of the Duty has been changed.
Justice Ginsburg, breaking with the Original Theory, presents (1)
The Duty of Disclosure to the Investor, (2) Unencumbered by a Fiducial
Accretion.
(1) The Duty of Disclosure to the Investor
The element of "deception" has been so integral to Section 10(b)
and its antecedent tort, common-law "deceit," that no theory interpreting
Section 10(b) would dare deny its presence. "Deception" had to be kept
at the center of any theory.
The Original Theory, therefore, kept "deception," but remarkably
shifted it from the deceit of the Victim of an O'Hagan lie to the corpora-
132. See O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2224.
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tion O'Hagan worked for. According to the Original Theory, the Victim
deceived was Grand Met whom O'Hagan failed to inform that he had
learned of the forthcoming takeover and intended to trade on that
information.
Justice Ginsburg, however, sensed that a duty to Grand Met had
little relevance to the Investors' loss of $4 million. So, she surrepti-
tiously shifted the Duty from Grand Met to the cheated public Investors.
The Disclosure Element of the Duty
No pressing need prompted Ginsburg to dilate on the elemental
requisite of "disclosure" itself. As a result, she simply
outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic, confidential
information.
The word "outlaws" compresses the declaration: "The law imposes
a duty not to. . . .' Without more, "outlaws" carries the burden of a
prohibition, a negative command: To forgo. In the specific case at
hand, the law forbids "tradfing] on the basis of nonpublic [that is,
undisclosed] information."' 33 Here is the Ginsburg Duty of Disclosure.
Elsewhere in her Opinion, she inveighs against "secret [undis-
closed] profits" reaped by the "fiduciary-turned-trader. "' She con-
demns the Insider who "secretly," that is, without disclosure, uses
"information for personal gain"'35 by lying about the stock's true value.
Although it received no particular emphasis in the Ginsburg New
Theory, the requirement of "deception" is manifest throughout. The
stress rather was on: Who was deceived?
The Object of the Deception: The Investor
Justice Ginsburg had concluded, at least subliminally, that decep-
tion of Grand Met or of the Dorsey law firm somehow was unrelated to
the crime that produced the $4 million in losses to public Investors. And
that, to the contrary, the public Investor would never have lost $4 mil-
lion if he had known the true value of the traded stock. Briefly, the
Investor, undeceived, would simply never have sold.
So, Justice Ginsburg altered her Amalgam to fit the crime, and thus
permit her to convict James Herman O'Hagan, which she could never
conscientiously do if it were Grand Met or Dorsey who had been
wronged. Wronged, that is, according to her New Theory.
She might even have extrapolated the civil applicability of such a
133. See id. at 2217.
134. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207.
135. Id. at 2208 (quoting Brief for the United States at 17) (emphasis added).
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holding and realized that Grand Met and Dorsey were highly improbable
plaintiffs in a civil action to recover $4 million in losses suffered by
unrelated third parties, the public Investors. Especially inasmuch as
Grand Met and Dorsey-at least Grand Met, since Dorsey's reputation
did suffer from a totally collateral wrong-showed no signs of Insider
Trading losses.
Reasoning in such a manner, Justice Ginsburg accordingly made no
mention whatsoever in her Amalgam definition of the "owner" whence
the information, but spoke throughout of the Investor as the beneficiary
of the Duty to ,Disclose.
A single, synoptic reading of the Amalgam will establish Gins-
burg's understanding as to the proper thrust of her New Theory:
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
Trading to gain no-risk profits - that is, the Investor's dis-
advantage stems from contrivance -a self-serving abuse
that will affect the security price when revealed to Investors,
with resultant harm to the Investors.
The fraud is consummated only through securities
transactions.
In this one synoptic reading Justice Ginsburg directs sole attention
to the Investor. She adverts explicitly to the fact that the information is
"nonpublic," i.e., undisclosed. That it has not been "revealed to Inves-
tors." That this nondisclosure will bring "harm to the Investor."'36
Later in the Amalgam, the Justice again concentrates on the Inves-
tor when she explains how the nondisclosure of secret information
redounds to "the Investor's disadvantage" by deliberate "contrivance,
not luck," in that Chiarella or O'Hagan took "undue advantage"-in
the words of the SEC's classic expression of the basic evil of Insider
Trading, Cady, Roberts137-of his trading partner, the innocent Investor.
The concluding words of the Amalgam-"uses the information
through securities transactions"-seems to be (1) an advertent exclu-
sion of the 'Owner' of the Information and (2) a conscious reference to
the Investor. Quite clearly, the only parties to the "securities transac-
tions" are the O'Hagans and Chiarellas on the one hand, and the trading
partners, "the Investors," on the other.
(2) Unencumbered by a Fiducial Accretion
The absence of any fiducial element in the Amalgam could suffice,
at least negatively, for the unqualified nature of the New Theory's Duty.
136. Id. at 2207.
137. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911, 912 (1961).
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In a matter of such controversy besetting the Original Theory, Justice
Ginsburg could surely be expected to specify explicitly her Duty as
Fiduciary if she had determined to perpetuate the Fiduciary Fallacy138
foisted on the law of Insider Trading by Chiarella in 1980.
However, considering the overall disorganization and rambling of
the Opinion, it would be attributing too much securities-law expertise to
Justice Ginsburg to conclude, in her break with the Original Theory, that
she now engaged explicitly in the salutary cleansing of the law of Insider
Trading by removing that untenable Fiduciary encumbrance of
Chiarella and Dirks.
Nonetheless, the conclusion is justified that Justice Ginsburg had in
fact removed the fiduciary element from her Duty to Disclose to the
Investor. The failure even to use the word "fiduciary" in connection
with Duty is too notable in light of the controversy surrounding the
subject.
C. The Victim: The Deceived Investor
The Amalgam
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
(1) Trading on the basis of nonpublic, confidential informa-
tion, (2) By an outsider to a corporation
(3) To gain no-risk profits - that is, (4) the Investor's dis-
advantage stems from contrivance, not luck and cannot be
overcome with research or skill -
(5) Which is a self-serving abuse that will affect the corpora-
tion's security price when revealed to Investors,
(6) With resultant harm to Investors.
(7) Finally, the fraud is consummated only when he uses the
information through securities transactions.139
A most perplexing insight into the mind of Justice Ginsburg
emerges from the tortured reasoning surrounding this question, so funda-
mental to the law of Insider Trading: Who really is injured by the
Insider's use of nonpublic information in a securities transaction?
When James Herman O'Hagan lied to his sellers about the true
value of their stock, did his lie injure the Investors who lost $4 million?
Or did the deceit harm Grand Met who was soon to announce an above-
market offer for Pillsbury stock? Or the Dorsey law firm whence James
Herman learned of the pending offer?
The primitive simplicity of the choice leaped at Justice Ginsburg
138. See Bayne, supra note 68.
139. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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from the pages of the O'Hagan record. Except to one enmeshed in the
web of legalisms and arcane theorizing entangling the recent Theory
opinions, this stark confrontation between the respective potential Vic-
tims of the Insider Trade would be faced without hesitancy. Obviously,
the Investor was the only Victim. But, to the New Theory, the choice of
the Victim would be deeply discomfiting and would require remarkably
agile footwork to resolve.
The Earlier Victims
Moreover, the confrontation between competing Victims was inten-
sified by the other four Theory cases-Bryan,14 ° Cherif, 4 ' Clark, '42 and
Chestman'4 3 in addition to O'Hagan.
In each of these cases the injury suffered by the antagonistic Vic-
tims because of the Insider's "trading on the basis of nonpublic, confi-
dential information"1  was uniformly marked by glaring disparity.
In all the cases, the trading Victim, on the other side of the trade
from the Insider, suffered substantial dollar injury. The $4-million
Investor losses in O'Hagan were the greatest by far of the five cases.
These, of course, would be most vivid to Justice Ginsburg.
But, Danny Cherif netted $247,000 in a mere nine months 45 from
his unknowing Victims. John Naylor Clark and his tippee Van Moppes
swindled the public Investor out of $55,000. 146 Keith Loeb, in the
Supermarket Soap, "disgorged $22,000 profit and paid a $22,000
fine." ' 47 "Butch" Bryan and friends purchased over 6,000 public shares
from unknowing shareholders on the basis of confidential, inside infor-
mation.' 48 The lost dollars were painfully palpable to the deceived
traders.
The Victims of the Theft of Information on the other side of the
confrontation suffered a far more intangible injury, if any at all. Any
140. See generally Bryan, 58 F.3d at 933 (involving mail fraud).
141. See generally Cherif, 933 F.2d at 403 (forgery document authorizing continued access to
bank after termination).
142. See generally Clark, 915 F.2d at 439 (knowing misappropriation and use of employer's
material nonpublic information).
143. See generally Chestman, 947 F.2d at 551 (concerning disclosure of business secrets
between family members).
144. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2219.
145. Cherif 933 F.2d at 406-07.
146. Bayne, supra note 11, at 138 & nn. 395-97. See also Clark, 915 F.2d at 442.
147. Bayne, supra note 11, at 85 & n.50.
148. Bryan, the West Virginia Lottery Director, purchased, on the basis of inside information,
market shares of public companies doing business with the Lottery and also passed the
information on to the Lottery's counsel, who also bought and tipped two friends. See United
States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 939 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. ReBrook, 58 F.3d 961, 963-64
(4th Cir. 1995).
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loss, moreover, took on a totally different tortious nature. Danny
Cherif's Victim, according to Theory proponents, was First Chicago, the
bank from which Danny learned of an impending deal. The litigable
harm inflicted on First Chicago smacked more of invasion of privacy,
breaking and entering, or various business-type torts. But certainly
nothing suffered by First Chicago suggested Insider Trading. 149
The same could be said of Smith & Nephew, "the British multina-
tional which lost not a farthing,"' 150 in Clark. And of Supermarket
Susan, from whom Keith Loeb learned his secret 5 ' (the Chestman court
felt Keith had no confidential relation with his wife! 52). And of the
West Virginia Lottery in Bryan.
The Ginsburg Fancy Footwork
This collective scenario led to the perplexing insight into the mind
of Justice Ginsburg. The deft manner in which she maneuvered between
these two classes of Victims explains her choice of the Investor as her
Victim in her New Theory. Excisions from the Amalgam, apropos,
summarize her selection:
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
Trading to gain no-risk profits - that is, the Investor's dis-
advantage stems from contrivance-a self-serving abuse
that will affect the security price when revealed to Investors,
with resultant harm to the Investors.
The fraud is consummated only through securities
transactions. 53
The Ginsburg selection of the Investor would seem easy in light of
the evidence before her. However, do not forget that Ginsburg was
enmeshed in the web of legalisms entangling the Original Theory.
149.
Danny Cherif, former employee of First Chicago, was able by stealth to purloin
from the Bank's loan department material secret information about impending
mergers. By buying low before and selling high after the public announcements,
Danny netted $247,000 in a mere nine months.
Bayne, supra note 11, at 141.
150. Id. at 140.
151. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 555-56. The facts are summarized as "The Supermarket Soap" in
Bayne, supra note 11, at 84-85.
152.
Keith's status as Susan's husband could not itself establish fiduciary status....
[B]ecause Keith owed neither Susan [his wife] nor the Waldbaum family [his in-
laws] a fiduciary duty or its functional equivalent, he did not defraud them by
disclosing [inside information] to Chestman [his broker].
Chestman, 947 F.2d at 571.
153. See supra note 105.
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Moreover, this is the O'Hagan case, and James Herman O'Hagan was
convicted under the Original Theory. The Original Theory repeatedly
held, by Ginsburg's admission, that the person or entity defrauded is not
the other party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic
information. 154
Pretty difficult for Ginsburg to fly full in the face of her own bald
statement. What could she say?
This categorical identification of the "Source"-First Chicago, the
Brit multinational, Susan, the Lottery, Grand Met-as the Victim of the
Deception of the Insider Trade intensified the need for agility to justify
her categorical statement in the Amalgam that the real Victim was the
defrauded Investor.
Ruth Bader Ginsburg began her way out of the quandary by resort-
ing to Academe in the person of a Barbara Bader Aldave. Barbara
Bader's quotation went to the core of the perplexity generated by the
Justice's reasoning:
[A] fraud or deceit can be practiced on one person [Grand Met], with
resultant harm to another person or group of persons [the $4-million
Investors]. 155
Lest one doubt that Justice Ginsburg could really be subscribing to
such a causal impossibility, she advanced her own version of the nonse-
quitur but with a slight shading that masked, somewhat, the glaring
illogic. However, the mask was unavailing, what with Aldave's blunt-
ness. Justice Ginsburg explains:
A misappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic
information, in short, gains his advantageous market position
through deception; he deceives the source of the information and
simultaneously harms members of the investing public.15 6
The gnawing thought arises: How could the "misappropriator" "harm a
member of the investing public," if, as Item (4) of the Original Theory
proclaims, "the Insider does not owe any duty to the public investor"?
No duty. No harm.
Justice Thomas could not abide such fallacious rationalization:
The majority's statement that a "misappropriator . . . deceives the
source of the information and simultaneously harms members of the
investing public," , . . focuses on the wrong point. Even if it is true
that trading on nonpublic information hurts the public, it is true
154. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (emphasis added).
155. Barbara Bader Aldave, Misappropriation: A General Theory of Liability for Trading on
Nonpublic Information, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. 101, 120 (1984) (emphasis added).
156. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (citing Aldave, 13 HOFSTRA L. REV. at 120-21 & n.107)
(emphasis added).
19981
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
whether or not there is any deception of the source of the
information. 15 7
Justice Thomas was likewise perplexed by Justice Ginsburg's
"fancy footwork," and showed his perplexity in a lengthy expos6. He
laid bare her fallacy:
The majority's statement, by arguing that market advantage is
gained "through" deception, unfortunately seems to embrace an error
in logic: Conflating causation and correlation. That the misap-
propriator may both deceive the source and "simultaneously" hurt the
public no more shows a causal "connection" between the two than
the fact that the sun both gives some people a tan and "simultane-
ously" nourishes plants demonstrates that melanin production in
humans causes plants to grow. In this case, the only element com-
mon to the deception and the harm is that both are the result of the
same antecedent cause - namely, using non-public information.' 58
That riposte should conclude the point. One wonders why Justice
Ginsburg was not fully true to her own New Theory, did not abandon the
Original Theory overtly rather than covertly, join the dissenting Justices,
and even win over a majority.
D. In Connection With a Deceitful Trade
The Amalgam
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
(1) Trading on the basis of nonpublic, confidential informa-
tion, (2) By an outsider to a corporation
(3) To gain no-risk profits - that is, (4) the Investor's dis-
advantage stems from contrivance, not luck and cannot be
overcome with research or skill -
(5) Which is a self-serving abuse that will affect the corpora-
tion's security price when revealed to Investors,
(6) With resultant harm to Investors.
(7) Finally, the fraud is consummated only when he uses the
information through securities transactions.
When the tort of Deceit was codified into Section 10(b), the Con-
gress appended certain federal requirements to the substantive elements
taken directly from the common law.'5 9 Among the federal additions,
and the one pertinent to this discussion, was the proviso that Deception,
157. Id. at 2225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
158. Id. at 2226 n.7 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).




the basic tort, be committed "in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security. ""'
The purpose of this provision was merely to limit the all-inclusive
concept of Deceit to a narrower class of scams, the stock fraud. Con-
gress did not want to load up this securities statute with alien deceptive
practices already subject to their own appropriate statutory or common-
law prohibitions.'6 1
Recall the pertinent remarks of Milton Freeman summing up the
legislative history in one anecdote, which concluded with Commissioner
Sumner Pike's lone comment: "Well, we are against fraud, aren't
we?"1
6 2
The limitation to security fraud was, therefore, in effect, a nonsub-
stantive provision that did not go to the essence of the tort, but was of a
procedural or jurisdictional nature. The "in connection with" merely
said that if the Deception involves an (1) Investor (2) Deceived (3)
Through a Securities Transaction, the malefactor is liable under Section
10(b). If not, the action lies elsewhere. Perhaps simple Theft, Embez-
zlement, or the Taking of Money under False Pretenses. Wisely, the
Congress did not wish to convert the myriad variations of Deceit com-
mon in human conduct into federal offenses. Even the government has
finite resources.
Theft vis-a-vis Stock Scam
This fourth Essential of the New Theory, therefore, is totally depen-
dent on the content of the first three. The intrinsic nature of the securi-
ties tort of Insider Trading is not indistinguishable from the intrinsic
nature of the multitude of other, garden-variety deceptive practices. To
the contrary, the accidental quality that distinguishes the securities fraud
from its other deceptive cousins is the "in connection with" proviso.
Thus, "in connection with" is merely the accidental, distinguishing ele-
ment that sets off, gives special individuality to, the Insider Trade of
Section 10(b).
"In connection with" has no independent substantive content of its
own. Its sole objective is to determine if the three essential elements of
the tort proper, Deceit, were all committed as part of, during, in connec-
tion with, through a securities transaction and not as part of, during, in
160. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
161. Louis Loss agrees with the Supreme Court in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder that Section
10(b) is a "'catch all,"' and that "[t]he Commission got [in Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5] what it
wanted-a handle for investigating and obtaing injunctive relief against insiders who were buying
their companies' stock." Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES
REGULATION 778, 779 (3d ed. 1995).
162. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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connection with, a pigeon drop, a bunco game, or any other variant of
nonstock frauds by which the unwary are relieved of their money.
If all the substantive elements of the tort add up to a Theft, the tort
is necessarily in connection with a Theft. To the contrary, if each intrin-
sic essential of Insider Trading involves (1) The Breach of a (2) Duty to
Disclose (3) To an Investor during a stock sale, the malefaction was
committed "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
Moreover, to clinch the matter and facilitate the present analysis, all
substantive essentials of the common-law Deceit-the non-federal-
accretion elements-were purposefully incorporated in the Amalgam of
the Ginsburg New Theory.
The Ginsburg Fourth Essential
This study of Justice Ginsburg's "imaginative construction" of her
own "in connection with"-to complete her "novel theory"-is, there-
fore, wholly anticlimactic. She has already laid out all the essentials of
the tort and has located them, again, willy-nilly, inside, during, integral
to, through a securities transaction.
To gain the Ginsburg answer to "in connection with" what?, there-
fore, simply study in turn her treatment of the connection between the
securities transaction, "the purchase or sale of any security," and suc-
cessively: (1) The Breach: The Gravamen: Nondisclosure to the Inves-
tor, (2) A Simple Duty: To Disclose to the Investor, (3) The Victim: The
Deceived Investor. In these three are contained all the essentials of
Insider Trading. If all three constituent essentials of the tort are in con-
nection with a trade, the total tort is necessarily in connection with the
securities trade.
How, therefore, does the New Theory connect each with a security
transaction?
(1) The Breach: The Gravamen: Nondisclosure to the Investor
The Ginsburg Opinion is shot through with statements placing the
Breach, the Deception itself, squarely inside the stock trade. At an early
point, Justice Ginsburg states:
The misappropriation theory targets information of a sort that
misappropriators ordinarily capitalize upon to gain no-risk profits
through the purchase or sale of securities.163
Thus, the New Theory does not "target"- that is, outlaw-information
that "gains no-risk profits "from the Source of the Information. Rather,
the target is the well-known Inside Information which the O'Hagans,
163. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2209 (emphasis added).
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Chiarellas and Boeskys have long used to deceive the unknowing public
Investor.
However, the most unhesitating connection of the Deception with
the Insider Trade itself comes when Justice Ginsburg wishes to satisfy
doubters about her firm adherence to the "in connection with" requisite
of Section 10(b). In the process, she even directly disavows any connec-
tion with the Theft:
We turn next to the § 10(b) requirement that the misap-
propriator's deceptive use of information be "in connection with the
purchase or sale of [a] security." This element is satisfied because
the fiduciary's fraud is consummated, not when the fiduciary gains
the confidential information [the so-called Theft], but when, without
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or
sell securities.'64
Those words, without more, establish a causal nexus between the decep-
tion and the harm to the Investor.
The Consummation of the Fraud
The implications of the word 'consummated' are conclusive in this
matter. It is a strong and definitive word. Webster's defines its adjec-
tival form:
conesumemate . . . adj . . . 1 : complete in every detail: perfect
165
The Theory may dilate unreservedly on all the antecedent details of
whatever transpired when the Insider obtained the Information-
whether by happenstance, innocent eavesdropping, or chicanery-but all
are, nonetheless, intrinsically irrelevant to what he later did with the
information. Had the Insider stopped with the obtainment only, no evil
consequences of a securities trade would have occurred.
The essential element of an Insider Trade is the actual, subsequent
"use" of "the information to purchase or sell securities." Only in the
trading is the fraud "consummated, " "complete in every detail: per-
fect." The Government Brief put it this way:
Here, the misappropriated information had personal value to [James
Herman O'Hagan] only because of its utility in securities trading;
indeed, his misappropriation was not complete until he traded on the
information. [O'Hagan's] fraud consisted of the deceptive use of the
information about Grand Met's plans for the purpose of [his] trading;
the trading was an essential element of [O'Hagan's] "deceptive
device." The misappropriation theory thus depends on an inherent
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 282 (1988).
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connection between the deceptive conduct and the purchase or sale of
a security.'
66
The meaning of those words is indisputable. Note particularly that "the
deceptive use of the information" is not in connection with the Theft but
"for the purpose of [his] trading" with the Investor.
When pressed by Justice Souter during Oral Argument, Deputy
Solicitor General Dreeben put in the last nail:
[Justice Souter]: So what you're saying ... is in this case the misap-
propriation can only be of relevance, or is of substantial relevance,
... with reference to the purchase of securities.
"[Mr. Dreeben]: Exactly.
"[Justice Souter]: When you take money out of the accounts [that is,
steal dollars rather than learn information] you can go to the race-
track, or whatever.
"[Mr. Dreeben]: That's exactly right, and because of that difference,
[there] can be no doubt that this kind of misappropriation of property
[that is, inside information] is in connection with the purchase or sale
of securities.
"Other kinds of misappropriation of property may or may not,
but this is a unique form offraud, unique to the securities markets, in
fact, because the only way in which [James Herman O'Hagan] could
have profited through this information is by either trading on it [that
is, with an Investor] or by tipping somebody else to enable their
trades." 1
67
Justice Thomas was so impressed by that exchange that he quoted it in
full.
Justice Thomas correctly interpreted that statement:
The touchstone required for an embezzlement to be "use[d] or
employ[ed], in connection with" a securities transaction is not merely
that it "coincide" with, or be consummated by, the transaction, but
that it is necessarily and only consummated by the transaction.1
68
In other words: "The Fraud is not consummated in the Theft from the
Source but in the Deceit of the Investor."
The thrust of the New Theory is completely away from the Theft
from the Owner to the Deceit of the Investor, the party to the securities
transaction. The Government reiterated:
"[T]he requisite connection between the fraud and the securities trad-
ing [is] because it is only in the trading that the fraud is
166. Brief for Petitioner at 19, United States v. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. 2199 (1997) (No. 96-842)
(emphasis added).
167. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2222-23 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 19) (emphasis added).





Justice Thomas continued to explain his meaning by pointing out:
[I]f the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the
confidential information, there is no "deceptive device ...... Yet...
the hypothesized "inhibiting impact on market participation" would
[still be present].... "Outsiders" would still be trading based on
nonpublic information that the average investor has no hope of
obtaining through his own diligence. 17
0
Since Justice Ginsburg placed the Deception of her New Theory
squarely "only in the trading," where did she place the Duty that for-
bade the illegal trading?
(2) A Simple Duty: To Disclose to the Investor
When Justice Ginsburg repeatedly emphasized that the Insider's
fraud is consummated only when he uses the information
through securities transactions'71
she has placed the Breach inside the stock sale. In that statement, she
effectively and necessarily also placed the Duty to Disclose to the Inves-
tor inside the stock sale as well.
This necessary and inevitable junction of Duty and Breach of Duty
flows from the intrinsic nature of "duty" and "breach" in any tort, as
well as Insider Trading. Remember:
Elementary logic moves the reasoning inexorably from the Vio-
lation of Section 10(b) to the Duty that the Violation violated. Since
the gravamen of the Wrong is Nondisclosure to the Investor, the Duty
is perforce: To Disclose to the Investor, to tell him the truth about the
value of the stock traded. From the malefaction Nondisclosure the
illation to the Duty of Disclosure can readily be made.' 72
This explains why Justice Ginsburg spent little effort in discussing
"duty" as such. She needed only to state summarily that her New
Theory
outlaws trading on the basis of nonpublic, confidential
information. 173
In this concise pronouncement in the Amalgam, the Justice has
declared that "the law of Insider Trading carries a duty not to trade on
the basis of deception." In and of itself, "outlaws" is a prohibition, the
169. Id. at 2223 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 8).
170. Id. at 2225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).




UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
expression of a negative duty. In this unqualified command is the New
Theory's Duty to Disclose to the Investor, and it concerns only the
Insider Trade with the duped Investor, with no mention of a Duty-let
alone a fiduciary one-to forgo "no-risk profits" in trading with the
Owner of the Information.
With that, Justice Ginsburg has placed the second substantive
Essential inside the securities transaction. But, where is the Victim of
Insider Trading? Was he harmed by the Theft. Or was he deceived in,
during, through, the stock sale?
(3) The Victim: The Deceived Investor
At this late stage in her "construction" of her New Theory 'from
whole cloth," the Justice had painted herself into only one possible con-
clusion: The Victim was the deceived Investor. A syncopation of the
Amalgam provides a precise summation of her reasoning:
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
Trading to gain no-risk profits-that is, the Investor's disad-
vantage stems from contrivance-a self-serving abuse
that will affect the security price when revealed to Investors,
with resultant harm to the Investors.
The fraud is consummated only through securities
transactions. 174
That syllogism effectively places, the Investor as the Victim: at the
heart of the securities transaction. The self-serving abuse, consum-
mated only through a securities transaction, brings resultant harm
to the Investor.
Justice Ginsburg's Fourth Essential has now been firmly estab-
lished. All three substantive essentials of the tort are in connection with
a trade. Therefore, the total tort is necessarily in connection with a
securities transaction.
A Climactic Fillip: The First Shall Be Last
Before concluding this second Section of the Study, some clinching
insights into the Ginsburg reasoning are worthy of comment.
The first paragraph in her Opinion gives pause to the earlier suspi-
cion of this Article that Justice Ginsburg had, as if by chance, naively
stumbled onto her New Theory while thinking through her Opinion.
And that she was unknowingly driven to her New Theory by a sublimi-
nal, unstated realization that James Herman O'Hagan could never be




That first paragraph speaks sharply otherwise: Rather that hers was
a calculated determination to substitute her New Theory for the Original
Theory. And thereby affirm O'Hagan's conviction on legitimate
grounds.
Her opening words, which posed exactly the technical question her
opinion would answer, bespeak a fully excogitated purpose to bypass,
finesse, ignore, the Original Theory and "construct" her own New The-
ory "from whole cloth."
With this thought in mind, consider how Justice Ginsburg phrases
her question before the Court. This is "the issue" "we address":
Is a person who trades in securities for personal profit, using confi-
dential information misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to
the source of the information, guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule
l0b-5? 175
"The issue," when examined closely, turns out to be a blending of
two disparate definitions. The first is an approximation of her nascent
New Theory, segregated herewith in boldface:
Is a person who trades in securities for personal profit, using con-
fidential information
misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of the
information,
guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5?17 6
The second, inserted parenthetically by Justice Ginsburg within the first,
is a misleading distortion of the Original Theory:
Is a person who trades in securities for personal profit, using confi-
dential information
misappropriated in breach of a fiduciary duty to the source of
the information,
guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5? 177
This insertion is merely an irrelevant comment on later-to-be-used infor-
mation. She might just as well have said:
Is a person who trades in securities for personal profit, using confi-
dential information
overheard accidentally at the Minneapolis Club bar,
guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5? 178
This artful presentation of her chosen "issue" in the very first para-
graph of her Opinion provides a perfect presage of the work of Justice
Ginsburg in constructing her New Theory. Her conscious draft of the
175. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2205.
176. Id. (format altered for emphasis).
177. Id. (format altered for emphasis).
178. Id. (format altered for emphasis).
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O'Hagan issue confirms the Thesis of this Study that Ginsburg never
addressed-or even intended to address-the conformity of the Original
Theory to Section 10(b). Rather, she asked: Is a person who violates the
New Theory liable under Section 10(b)?
Close scrutiny of her formally stated "issue" yields two reflections
in strong corroboration of the overall analysis of the New Theory: (a)
Ginsburg's Garbled Blend of the Two Theories, and (b) The Irrelevancy
of the Source of the Information.
(a) Ginsburg's Garbled Blending of the Two Theories
The format used above to quote the Ginsburg "issue before the
Court" was designed to highlight the purposeful blending of the two
Theories as if only the Original Theory were presented for adjudication.
The New Theory
Separate her "issue"' into the two parts presented above. First, the
truncated version of her New Theory:
[W]e address [this] issue[ ]: (1) Is a person who trades in securities
for personal profit, using confidential information. . ., guilty of vio-
lating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. 17 9
Is that not a syncopated version, somewhat loose perhaps but suffi-
cient, of the Amalgam of the New Theory? Implicit is (a) Nondisclosure
to the Investor, (b) The Duty to Disclose, (c) The Victim: The Deceived
Investor, (d) In a Deceifful Trade. She did not spell out the Essentials,
but they are there.
The Original Theory
Second, Justice Ginsburg inserts into the middle of the New Theory
an inaccurate, even distorted, version of the Original Theory:
[The use of] confidential information misappropriated in breach of a
fiduciary duty to the source of the information .... 180
But-and here is the clincher-where is Item (4) of the Original Theory:
"(4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of the
traded stock"?.81 Remember that that was finally paraphrased to read:
The misappropriation theory authorizes the criminal conviction of a
person (4) without taking into account whether or not the Insider
owed any duty to disclose to the Investor, deceived the Investor, or
harmed the Investor with whom he traded the stock. Liability is pres-
179. Id. (emphasis added).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. Clark, 915 F.2d at 443 (emphasis added).
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ent in any case.
18 2
Where in the "issue before the Court" are the four Essentials of the Orig-
inal Theory, other than Theft?
Her "issue" does not address the Original Theory at all. The Origi-
nal Theory contains Item (4), which negates, emasculates, the central
thrust of the entire Theory. Without Item (4) the Original Theory falls.
Her Nascent Theory Takes Shape
The extent of Ginsburg's garbled thinking becomes clearer-as
does the growth of her New Theory-as she subtly identifies her New
Theory with the Classical or Traditional Theory of Section 10(b). This
is understandable because her New Theory, in the end, embodies most
of the Classical essentials.
Once the Justice has virtually equated her New Theory with the
approach of the SEC's Cady, Roberts and its Classical progeny, she then
tries to pretend that her evolving New Theory is really not inconsistent
with the Original Theory. Expectably, the result is neither fish nor flesh
nor good red herring. She ignores the genuine, reciprocal antagonism of
the two. Note this conciliatory attempt:
The two theories [the Classical and the Misappropriation] are
complementary, each addressing efforts to capitalize on nonpublic
information through the purchase or sale of securities.18 3
Certainly, this is redolent of her commingling of the New and Original
Theories in her "issue before the Court." Further, it is a first step in
supplanting the Original Theory with her own New Theory.
In the same paragraph, she follows this attempt at conciliation by
beginning her "construction from whole cloth" of her New Theory. She
assumes that the Original Theory is in truth "complementary" to the
Classical Theory-and in turn to her New Theory-instead of diametri-
cally opposed. These words eventually appeared in the Amalgam:
The misappropriation theory [she really means Classical Theory or
her New Theory] is thus designed to "protec[t] the integrity of the
securities markets against abuses by 'outsiders' to a corporation who
have access to confidential information that will affect th[e] corpo-
ration's security price when revealed .... ' 84
This initial instance of her subtle supplanting of the Original The-
ory with the New Theory by way of equating the Classical Theory with
182. See supra, The Translation of Item (4) into English, at 222-25.
183. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207 (emphasis added).
184. Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 14) (emphasis added) (recall that the bold typeset for
emphasis indicates verbatim Ginsburg in the Amalgam.).
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her New Theory is corroborative of the Ginsburg approach so fully
detailed thus far.
(b) The Irrelevancy of the Source of the Information
Whence the Information? is a perennial red herring, diverting the
courts from the solution of the Insider Trading problem. It led Justice
Powell from the real issue in Chiarella, and it has befuddled Justice
Ginsburg in O'Hagan. It matters not a whit how, where, or when James
Herman O'Hagan found out about the Grand Met takeover. He could
have been infused with a divine light. The Source is of no moment.
The only important point from the deceived Investors' view-and
for liability under Section 10(b)-is the one relevant fact that James
Herman O'Hagan knew and acted on the secret information. How,
where, or when he got it does not matter.
Recall 1994 and "Chiarella and the 'Fiduciary' Fallacy." The
Court was niff-naffing over the source of Vinnie's secret information.
Here is how that question was answered:
Does it matter whether Mr. Chiarella learned of the Colgate-
induced increase in the value of Riviana Foods from any of a dozen
other sources? Would the innocent seller of the undervalued shares
care how Chiarella heard of the true value, or rather that Chiarella did
know? Would not the victim be equally injured if the information
came from:
- the night janitor at Colgate
- the mistress of Riviana's CEO
- the waiter in Colgate's dining room
- the Riviana switchboard
- the contr6leur of Colgate
- [ I] the Pandick markup room?
Merely to pose the question prompts the easy answer. The Sec-
ond Circuit had no hesitancy: "That [Chiarella] was not [inside Rivi-
ana] is true, but irrelevant." Irrelevant is the word.1 85
Put James Herman O'Hagan in Vinnie's shoes and ask similar questions:
Does it matter when or how or whence James Herman O'Hagan
learned of the Grand Met takeover of Pillsbury? Would the innocent
seller of the undervalued shares care how O'Hagan heard of the true
value, or rather that O"Hagan did know? Would not the victim be
equally injured if the information came from:
- the night janitor at Grand Met
- the mistress of a Dorsey senior partner
- the waiter in Grand Met's dining room
185. Bayne, supra note 68, at 701-02 (quoting Chiarella, 588 F.2d at 1364).
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- the Dorsey switchboard
- a chance remark at the Minneapolis Club bar
- a water-cooler 'misappropriation' at Dorsey?
Merely to pose the question prompts the easy answer. Irrelevant
is the word.
Thus, the opening question posed to the Court-the burden Justice
Ginsburg set for the Majority to carry-never contemplated addressing
the Misappropriation Theory. She stated her position clearly, if only the
reader were to read it. Her question addressed the New Theory, and her
answer replied with the New Theory.
The four Essentials of her New Theory have now been adequately
analyzed by Justice Ginsburg and categorized in the logical subdivisions
of her definition as synthesized in the Amalgam. This New Theory per-
mit[s] the Majority to reverse the Eighth Circuit and concur in the con-
viction of James Herman O'Hagan for Insider Trading.
These Essentials lend themselves well to graphic representation and
in turn are well adapted to facilitate the planned juxtaposition with their
counterparts in the Original Theory that sent James Herman O'Hagan to
jail.
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The New Theory Essentials
A Simple Duty:
To Disclose to the Investor
The Victim:
The Deceived Investor
III. THE Two 'THEORIES' IN JUXTAPOSITION
Because we have no regulation squarely setting forth some
version of the misappropriation theory as the Commission's inter-
pretation of [Section 10(b)], we are left with little more than the
Commission's litigating position or the majority's completely novel








Commission . . . That position . ..can provide no basis for
liability.
-THOMAS, J., dissenting in O'Hagan.186
The juxtaposition of the Original Theory against the New Theory
should give conclusive proof that Justice Thomas was correct: "Until
today, the theory has never existed."'87
As a prelude to this setoff, consider the most-succinct-possible defi-
nitions of the two Theories:
The Two Theories Distilled
The Original Theory: In the first Section of this Study the Misap-
propriation Theory was boiled down to the minimum. After laborious
analysis, the Original Theory, free of all legalistic verbiage, and in
understandable language, came down to this:
The Insider "steals" Information from his employer, the Victim.
Later he uses the information, in some guiltless way, in an unrelated
securities trade.
According to the Theorists, this Theft from the Source was supposed to
constitute Deception of the Investor, "in connection with" a securities
transaction. And hence result in liability under Section 10(b).
The New Theory: Correspondingly, the second Section found that
the Amalgam, in Justice Ginsburg's own words, summarized the Insider
Trade this way:
The Insider uses nonpublic Information in a securities trade to
Deceive an Investor, the Victim.
That overview should crystallize the antipolarity of these two inter-
pretations of the Federal law of Insider Trading.
The wonder is that two knowledgable antagonists, applying their
respective Theories, could study the same straightforward violation of
Section 10(b) in O'Hagan and reach two totally conflicting analyses.
Especially when the Insider Trade is in fact a rudimentary business scam
that a layman could penetrate in a trice: Witness the five Fables.
As the bare-bones juxtaposition of the four Essentials of the two
Theories progresses, reflect on the expectable reactions of a mythical
Panel of these citizens: (1) The newly-wed couple atop the Nuclear
Dump, (2) The Kansas widdie-woman, (3) A TGS investor who sold his
ore-laden shares, (4) One of Vinnie's conned sellers, or (5) Any of the
innocents who lost $4 million to James Herman O'Hagan.
186. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2226 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Scalia, J.).
187. Id. at 2225 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
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Would that Panel conclude for each Fable that (1) The Gravamen
was a Theft, or a Lie? (2) The Duty was Not To Steal, or To Disclose the
True Value? (3) The Victim was the Source of the Undisclosed Informa-
tion or the Cheated Trader? (4) The Trade was In Connection With a
Theft of some Information, or a Sale of Stock or House?
The conclusion should be inevitable: The Ginsburg New Theory is
totally foreign to the Original Theory.
This concluding Section will highlight the boiled-down Essentials
of each Theory: A. The Gravamen. B. The Duty. C. The Victim. D.
The Locus of the Insider Trade.
A. The Gravamen
The First Essential of the The First Essential of the
Original Theory New Theory
The Gravamen: The Gravamen:
Theft of Information Nondisclosure to the
Investor
In this and succeeding comparisons, begin with the Original Theory
and follow with the New Theory.
(1) Theft: The Core of the Original Theory
At no point did any of the five conflicting Circuits dispute the The-
ory's central thesis as summed up by the Winter Five in Chestman:
[Tiheft rather than fraud or deceit, seems the gravamen of the [mis-
appropriation] prohibition. 88
The six-Judge Meskill Majority made that characterization unanimous in
Chestman:
Under this misappropriation theory, the "fraud" requirement of Rule
lOb-5 is deemed to be satisfied when a person "misappropriates
material nonpublic information .... 189
The only dissentient voices among the Circuits tended to strengthen
the position of Theft as the heart of the Theory. In the Second, concern
had arisen as to whether the fiduciary appendage was really needed at
all. Thus, in the earliest Theory case, Newman:' 90
188. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 578 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(emphasis added).
189. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (quoting Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566) (emphasis added).
190. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1982).
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[T]he [Newman] court held that Rule lOb-5's predicate fraud require-
ment was established through the mere theft of the confidential infor-
mation ... 191
This "mere theft" was also enough for the Seventh Cherif opinion,
in 1991 had conjectured that perhaps the Original Theory would apply
Section 10(b) "even to 'mere' thieves " 9 -with no "fiducial" ele-
ment-as long as the Theft was followed sometime later by an unrelated
stock trade, even though that trade was totally free of deception or harm
to an Investor.
In the Original Theory, therefore, Theft was indisputably the grava-
men of the Insider Trade. But what of the New Theory?
(2) Nondisclosure to the Investor: The Core of the New Theory
The surest way to present Justice Ginsburg's stance on the Grava-
men of the Insider Trade is through a condensed reading of the Amal-
gam. That, after all, represents her essential thinking in her own words.
The Amalgam centers on the Nondisclosure of Inside Information
to the Investor. Witness this edited version:
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
Trading on nonpublic confidential information
to gain no-risk profits - that is, the Investor's disadvantage
stems from contrivance - a self-serving abuse,
with resultant harm to the Investor when revealed.
The fraud is consummated through the securities
transaction. 193
Little commentary is needed beyond Justice Ginsburg's own state-
ments. Her objective: To state unequivocally this first Essential of the
New Theory, the Gravamen of the tort, (1) Nondisclosure to an Investor,
(2) In a Stock Sale, (3) With an Investor.
She achieves her goal by the use of several dispositive words. To
express the key "Nondisclosure," she relies on "nonpublic confiden-
t/a/' and "when revealed."1 94
For "to an Investor," her words are an "Investor's disadvantage"
and "to an Investor when revealed."1 95
To establish that deceit was "of an Investor," she says that "fraud is
The Bryan court noted: "Newman concluded easily that the misappropriation of information
constitutes "fraud" under Rule l0b-5. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 954.
191. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 954 (emphasis added).
192. Cherif, 933 F.2d at 412 n.6 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)).
193. See supra text accompanying note 105.
194. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2207. See supra text accompanying note 105.
195. See id. at 2207.
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consummated through the securities transaction."'96
Theft from a third party far from the securities trade and uncon-
cerned about it, on one hand, and Deception of the party to the trade, on
the other, could not be more antipolar concepts.
B. The Duty
The Second Essential of the The Second Essential of the
Original Theory New Theory
A Fiduciary Duty: A Simple Duty:
Not to Steal To Disclose to the Investor
(1) The Original Theory: From Theft to the Duty Not To Steal
The earlier analysis of Duty according to the Original Theory con-
cluded with a brief syllogism:
The reasoning is ready: Move from the Violation of the law to
the Duty that the violation violated. If the offense is Misappropria-
tion, Theft, the Duty necessarily must be: Not To Steal. From the
malefaction Theft, the illation to the Simple Duty Not To Steal easily
can be made.' 97
The Limitation to Fiduciary Thieves
The Original Theory then narrowed the compass of liability: Mere
Thieves had no Duty to forgo the Insider Trade. Only Trusted Thieves
were held to a Duty under Section 10(b).
This sharp restriction of Insider liability-to a limited group of
trustees, fiduciaries, friends and confidants-would remain totally
incomprehensible unless one knew of the recent history of Chiarella98
and its impact on the law of Insider Trading.
The Timorous Powell had shied away from holding every Insider
who deceived an Investor-that would have caught Vinnie in its net-so
he insisted that only those Insiders liable for lying would be those in a
fiduciary or other position of trust. That served Powell's purpose well,
but it saddled the Original Theory with absurd baggage. The result:
[T]he misappropriation theory . . . authorize[s] the criminal convic-
196. See id. at 2209.
197. See supra A Fiduciary Duty: Not to Steal.
198. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222 (1980). See generally, Bayne, supra note 68.
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tion of a person who "(1) misappropriates material nonpublic infor-
mation (2) by breaching a duty arising out of a relationship of trust
and confidence ... ."199
Which states accurately the Duty under the Original Theory: A
Fiduciary Duty: Not To Steal.
(2) The New Theory: From Nondisclosure to the Duty to Disclose
The same inexorable logic that led from Breach to the Duty
Breached, correspondingly led Justice Ginsburg to a brief conclusory
statement in the Amalgam:
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
Trading on nonpublic confidential information to gain no-
risk profits - that is, the Investor's disadvantage stems
from contrivance - a self-serving abuse, with resultant
harm to the Investor when revealed. The fraud is consum-
mated through the securities transaction.2"
This diametric opposition between the Theories persists in the sec-
ond Essential of the Insider Trade. The Duty Not To Steal from a Third
Party shows no resemblance to the Duty to Disclose to the Investor who
sits across the table in a stock trade.
C. The Victim
The Third Essential of the The Third Essential of the
Original Theory New Theory
The Victim: The Victim:
The Owner of Information The Deceived Investor
The Original Theory made no attempt to escape the trap it set for
itself. It could scarce deny that the only Victim of a Theft of Informa-
tion-it persisted in calling "snooping" or "innocent eavesdropping" or
simply "learning," theft-was he from whom the Information had been
howsoever obtained. The Theory called him the Source.
It was the Second Circuit's Newman-the first Theory case - that
gave birth to the concept. In Newman, the Source was an employer:
"The Court [in Newman] was ... influenced by the damage inflicted
199. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (quoting Clark, 915 F.2d at 443) (emphasis added).
200. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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on the insider trader's employer by a conniving employee."'
Thus, Newman considered that Section 10(b)-the Federal codification
of Deceit of an Investor in a stock sale-would find the Victim to be him
whence the Insider learned the confidential information that duped the
sellers into losing $4 million.
(2) The New Theory: From Deceit of the Investor to Harm to
the Investor
No one can accuse Justice Ginsburg of elegant reasoning on the
path to her preordained conclusion that the obvious Victim of the
O'Hagan con had to be the poor Innocent who relied on the lie. But she
saw where she had to go, and thither she went, logic or no.
Her classic borrowing from Academe in explaining her logic on the
path to her goal will rank high in legal history:
[A] fraud or deceit can be practiced on one person [Grand Met], with
resultant harm to another person or group of persons [the $4-million
Investors] .202
That memorable sequence led the New Theory to the consequently-
then-tenable conclusion that the Victim of the Insider Trade was The
Deceived Investor.
The unjustifiability of the means-to-the-end withal, the end conclu-
sion nonetheless remains-for different, valid reasons-justified: The
Deceived Investor takes his proper place, opposite his antithetical coun-
terpart: The Owner of the Information.
D. The Locus of the Insider Trade
The Fourth Essential of the The Fourth Essential of the
Original Theory New Theory
With No Connection To In Connection With
a Deceitful Trade a Deceitful Trade
(1) The Locus According to the Original Theory: In a Theft
of Information
Also recall that the first three Essentials of the Insider Trade-the
201. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 955 (quoting Cherif, 933 F.2d at 409).
202. See Aldave, supra note 154, at 120 (emphasis added).
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necessary substantive elements of the tort, Deceit,-had all centered on
and were integral to the Theft:
(1) The Gravamen: Theft of Information, (2) A Fiduciary Duty: Not
To Steal and (3) The Victim: Owner of Information.
Thus (1) the Breach was Theft, (2) the Duty forbade Theft, and (3) the
aggrieved one was the Victim of Theft.
Also recall that this fourth Essential of the tort is only an accidental
procedural element, whose locus is dictated by the locus of the other
three substantive Essentials. Since these three were all integral to Theft,
the Original Theory concluded necessarily that the tort occurred "in con-
nection with" the Theft, that is, the locus of the tort, which the Theorists
nonetheless called Insider Trading, would be inside the Theft.
However, this truth flew in the face of the Federal proviso "in con-
nection with" a stock transaction. So, the Theory had to have resort to a
little legerdemain. Simultaneously, two contradictory steps were taken:
Step One: The Theory effected a camouflaged in-fact ditching of
the inconvenient proviso, "in connection with" a stock sale. By simply
adding the virtually unintelligible Item (4) of the consensus definition,
that obstacle was removed:
[Tihe misappropriation theory ... authorize[s] the criminal convic-
tion of a person... (4) "regardless of whether he owed any duties to
the shareholders of the traded stock. "203
Which, by the meticulous parsing of every word-aided by Web-
ster's-yielded a translation that meant, in ordinary every-day English:
(4) without taking into account whether the Insider owed any duty to
the public Investor.2"
And that in turn meant:
The Trusted Thief would still be liable under the Theory, even though
(a) He owed no Duty to an Investor, (b) Breached No Duty to an
Investor, (c) In no way Wronged an Investor, in a totally guiltless
trade.
That effectively emasculated "in connection with."
Step Two: Then, by the addition of a now-meaningless Item (3) to
the consensus definitioi-"(3) uses that information in a securities
transaction"-lip-service was duly paid to Section 10(b), and the The-
ory was satisfied that it had adequately confused the Bench, the Bar, and
Academe.
But the net result nonetheless remained: The Theory's tort
203. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944 (quoting Clark, 915 F.2d at 443) (emphasis added).
204. See supra, The Translation of Item (4) into English, at 222-25.
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occurred-was consummated in-the 'Theft' of Information, and hence
in fact had No Connection With a Deceitful Trade.
(2) According to the New Theory:
In Connection With a Deceitful Trade
At the far other end of the spectrum, the Ginsburg New Theory
places the Deceit as part of integral to, during, in connection with,
through a securities transaction, the Insider Trade of Section 10(b).
This was inevitable because Justice Ginsburg had already in her
Amalgam concluded that Deceit is the essence of Insider Trading: (1)
The Breach is Deceit, which is a violation of (2) The Duty Not to
Deceive (3) The Victim of the Deceit, the Investor.
Thus, the Breach of the Duty to the Investor clearly occurred "In
Connection With a Deceitful Trade."
The Summation
With that, all four Essentials of the New Theory can be herewith
gathered together-and thereby state the distillate of the New Theory-
in this synoptic reading of the Amalgam:
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
Trading on nonpublic confidential information to gain no-
risk profits - that is, the Investor's disadvantage stems
from contrivance - a self-serving abuse, with resultant
harm to the Investor when revealed. The fraud is consum-
mated through the securities transaction.0 5
Which has at last afforded a final hill-top view of the objective of
this Study to show that the Supreme Court never faced the real question
presented on certiorari: Does the Misappropriation Theory conform to
Section 10(b)? But rather that Justice Ginsburg and the Majority dis-
ported themselves in a lengthy obiter disquisition on "a novel New The-
ory," under which James Herman O'Hagan would rightly have been
convicted.
The final juxtaposition:
205. See supra text accompanying note 105.
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The Original Theory Essentials The New Theory Essentials
In a word, Justice Clarence Thomas, along with Justice Scalia and
the Chief Justice, accurately characterized "the dispositive flaw" of
O'Hagan:
[The Ginsburg Majority] engages in the "imaginative" exercise of
constructing its own misappropriation theory from whole cloth.
[This] new theory... suffers from a... dispositive flaw: It is not
the theory offered by the Commission. Indeed, . . . this . . . com-
pletely novel... theory has never been proposed by the Commission,
much less adopted by rule or otherwise.
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the record before us . . .because, until today, the theory has never
existed. In short, the.., new theory is simply not presented in this
case, and cannot form the basis for upholding [James Herman
O'Hagan's] convictions.206
Because we have no regulation squarely setting forth some ver-
sion of the misappropriation theory as the Commission's interpreta-
tion of [Section 10(b)], we are left with little more than the
Commission's litigating position or the majority's completely novel
theory that is not even acknowledged, much less adopted by the
Commission .... That position .. .can provide no basis for
liability.2°7
EPILOGUE
Arguably, the law of Insider Trading is now where it was when
Judge Hansen handed down O'Hagan for the Eighth Circuit, effecting a
3-to-2 conflict among the Circuits as to the applicability of the Misap-
propriation Theory to Section 10(b). The Thesis of this Study has been
established, and the work has been concluded. That is true, with one
notable exception.
The exception? The obiter reflections of Justice Ginsburg and the
Majority-and perhaps more to the point, the sound convictions of Jus-
tice Thomas, and Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice-have given
deeper insights than heretofore into the present Court's thinking on the
law of Insider Trading.
The future campaign, therefore, will now have further support for a
return to the rationality of the Traditional concepts of the SEC's Cady,
Roberts and its progeny.
The serious errors perpetuated by Ginsburg's O'Hagan warrant the
ready prediction that the Supreme Court will soon revisit the law of
Insider Trading toward cleaning up the mess.
Presumably, with the field now cleared of O'Hagan as a credible
adjudicative ruling, the invitation is loud and forceful to all: Enter the
lists. Attack the obiter errors of Ginsburg, as well as the longtime falla-
cies bedevilling the law of Insider Trading antedating O'Hagan.
Forward, therefore, to the inevitable articles that the obiter
O'Hagan is so unmistakably calling for.
And finally, to the second Article of this two-part series, "Insider
Trading Ignored."208
206. O'Hagan, 117 S. Ct. at 2224-25 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 2226 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
208. David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider Trading: Ginsburg's O'Hagan: Insider Trading
Ignored (forthcoming).
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